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foreign

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[Music]

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thank you all for bearing with us while

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we ironed out a few Tech bugs and

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welcome to this afternoon's last

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presentation which is called how to talk

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to cryptographers presented by Dan

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Shearer they will be around 10 minutes

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left at the end so if you have any

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questions please note them and ask them

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when the time arises so quickly to

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introduce Dan Dan has a long career in

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open source their current project is

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lumo SQL which embeds a new form of data

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security into the widely used embedded

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database SQL Lite today Dan shares with

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us the Lessons Learned working with

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developers on this security project

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please welcome Dan

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[Applause]

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well thank you Amy thank you Amy so

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there's been one or two little Mix-Ups

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um I'm very happy to continue uh with

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either but in fact this is the a very

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related talk uh of enforcing privacy

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rights against big Tech and big

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surveillance so um I suppose if I was

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there I'd ask for a show of hands

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um Amy can you hear me there are you

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expecting everybody uh how to talk to

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cryptographers or The Wider enforcing

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privacy rights because that is what I am

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good to go on so sorry about the mix-up

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I'm happy to listen to anything it's all

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good uh it looks like this is a unicast

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presentation here basically lumosql is a

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project that I've been working on now

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for three years mostly launched at Linux

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confer you 2020 and soft launch before

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that but that was the big deal

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and it turned out one little

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technical project

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um in the corner with two or three

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people has some very big uh and very

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significant ramifications and so this

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talk is to document the journey that

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we're on how it relates to privacy

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rights in Australia and around the world

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and how a different approach from the

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bottom up might be what we're looking

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for to solve some of the most pressing

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and Urgent issues

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um and so

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this is not necessarily what we see

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every time

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why do we care about privacy what is

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privacy there are some basic

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fundamentals about the nature of privacy

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that I suddenly found myself going back

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to about halfway through the lumo SQL

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project

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um

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the notion of privacy is more about a

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tummy feeling now a two-year-old can

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understand this and I really did have to

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look up some psychology on Toddlers and

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this sort of thing the notion of privacy

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as a visceral feeling that psychologists

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study is about

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um no you don't want to be dashed in on

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when you're maybe sitting on the

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bathroom or or doing something very

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intimate like that and it starts to

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develop about two to three years old and

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we still have it as uh as an innate

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feeling that there are some things which

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are very personal to ourselves we feel

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uncomfortable if we're sharing them we

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can set boundaries we decide who we

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share these things with

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um that is the notion of privacy as as a

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feeling and that's a very long way away

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from legislation and Tech and my my

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laptop and my phone and things like that

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uh whereas anonymity is the idea of

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hiding my identity so that I can act

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um or or indeed not act without anybody

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knowing who it is who's doing those

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things or who it is who holds that

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information

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um whilst related it's not that

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um toddler tummy feeling I'm going to

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keep coming back to

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and naturally security is related to the

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both of the above but the point of

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security is that

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um

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it allows privacy to exist you can have

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privacy without security uh it's not so

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common that it is possible but generally

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speaking imagine if we had a hotel and

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we had a very loquacious receptionist

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and that receptionist decided to ring up

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and tell everybody uh in the newspapers

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who was staying at the hotel well

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clearly that's a privacy breach

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but to fix it we go and have a word with

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the receptionist and say really that's

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not the way to behave and then we've

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fixed the security problem so there is

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no more privacy breach

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and so these things are very separate

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and

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in trying to figure out how can we do

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something about what is basically an

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epic ruling disaster of of privacy that

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affects us all with our children

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um we had to find the details

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of how do we uh Define these things so

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basically

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who has a right to privacy in indeed is

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privacy a right and the answer is yes

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and no now there's a lot of stuff on the

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screen right now we'll come back to that

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in a minute but all sorts of exciting

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things are up here about a Declaration

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of Human Rights and Australia has done

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things like sign and ratify and say what

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a wonderful thing about all of these in

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fact

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the answer is no we don't have a right

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to privacy

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not as a right in Australia enshrined in

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law now there are discussions about

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aspects of privacy in various laws there

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isn't really anything in the

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Constitution and there's quite a few

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court cases about aspects of privacy

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but what if you're not an Australian

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citizen

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uh what if you're an Australian citizen

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overseas

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and so who you are worldwide

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and where you are

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depends on whether you have a right to

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privacy which seems a bit strange if

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this is starting from a place of I feel

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like I have things that make me

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uncomfortable

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if other people were to know them why

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should that change whether I've taken

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one step to the left and I'm in the

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border of another country

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except if you're in an island like

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Australia all right and so

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um

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there we're going to have a look at all

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the different grades if you like of

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people

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um but the general notion here is that

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if you are in Europe then you have lots

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of Rights they're written down in law

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it's very very clear even if you're a

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visitor even if you're there as a

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student

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uh or even if you're a EU citizen

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traveling elsewhere

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if you're in some countries that copy

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Europe in some ways then you have a

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lesser version of that South Korea would

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argue it has a better version of that

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that's arguable and then the other

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countries go down from there so yes and

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no do you have a right to privacy a lot

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less than you might think

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um and this is really a significant a

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bigger pardon a significant issue

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because most people seem to feel until

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it's a little bit too late but yes they

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have a right to privacy

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um now in 2017

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there's a fundamental case in Australia

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called the grub case where a journalist

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named Grubb

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um said to Telstra I'd like access to

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all of the metadata about me

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so that is the information about my

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personal information

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and it went up to the high court there

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was uh quite an argument about this and

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the answer was no

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no you cannot because metadata isn't

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really identifying the individual it's

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more about how Telstra provides the

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services to the individual that was a

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disastrous decision because metadata is

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at the core of a quality privacy regime

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and to take the European example which

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is uh some some countries have indeed

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taken on

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it's the concept is it's an ever

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expanding cloud of information so it's

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that which would tend to identify a

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person specifically

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uh and that changes by the day as yet

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another device comes along uh with yet

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another way of innovatively using my

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personal data and giving it to

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corporations like how many steps I take

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we're all familiar with that one yes but

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what about the way I walk that is unique

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to me

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um what about uh in in a very very

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genuine case that I was involved in

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um there's a

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a global name brand

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um charity

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that

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um often has a humanitarian mission

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there's a disaster in some country

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these people will turn up of a half

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dozen or so Global organizations they'll

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be there

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um there's been a hurricane there's been

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a there's been a total wave there's been

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a a war or whatever it may be

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um and then after this this terrible

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thing there's people who need help and

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what we need is information what help do

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they need how can we deliver what they

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need and so

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21st century we give our helpers tablets

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it has a survey and we go and ask

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questions

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what do you need

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uh how many people are in your household

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and how many children do you have a

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house does it have a roof

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is the roof tin or plastic

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do you have a goat these are really

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really important things and so then the

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food and shelter another Aid comes in

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and the humanitarian mission is underway

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and that's terrific but then what

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happens if two years later as that

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region is starting to pull itself

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together

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somebody decides that they're in charge

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and they'll be a government thank you

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very much and they've got a gun to say

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so and they would really like all of

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those surveys

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and that's when the information about

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your information you may not even have

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identified a particular child but you

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said they were there or we can maybe

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calculate

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the nature of the People by the kind of

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food that they said that they would like

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that is where we have a very direct

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implication of metadata getting into the

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wrong hands with an active life or death

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security risk and that's a very real one

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that non-government organizations are

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dealing with fairly often these days

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no

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um yes we should share yes we should be

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aware yes we should care

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and yes it's deeply related to things

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that we can feel unfortunately it just

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seems so abstract

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um and this is where

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we have to look at how things are and

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indeed how things are today

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in many ways is not so great and so what

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we're going to do uh is is consider

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if I'm in Australia what is the

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framework available to me and the answer

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is well there's laws at Federal level

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there's laws at state level there's some

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bold undertakings uh by the the current

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federal government that they're going to

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00:12:08,600 --> 00:12:15,779
review various aspects of privacy

284
00:12:12,000 --> 00:12:18,959
um at the end of uh end of 2022 there

285
00:12:15,779 --> 00:12:20,160
was a very helpful sounding law passed

286
00:12:18,959 --> 00:12:21,779
about

287
00:12:20,160 --> 00:12:24,540
um improving

288
00:12:21,779 --> 00:12:27,600
your remedies so if there is a mass data

289
00:12:24,540 --> 00:12:29,519
breach then companies have to pay quite

290
00:12:27,600 --> 00:12:31,920
a lot of money they should be worried

291
00:12:29,519 --> 00:12:34,140
about that so hopefully they won't be

292
00:12:31,920 --> 00:12:37,140
encouraging Mass data breaches

293
00:12:34,140 --> 00:12:39,899
but that's not the whole story there is

294
00:12:37,140 --> 00:12:42,240
no what is called law of tort or rather

295
00:12:39,899 --> 00:12:45,720
taught of privacy I should have said in

296
00:12:42,240 --> 00:12:48,540
Australia uh and what that means is it's

297
00:12:45,720 --> 00:12:51,600
not clear that for you the individual

298
00:12:48,540 --> 00:12:53,459
who has had their privacy infringed in

299
00:12:51,600 --> 00:12:55,139
some way that maybe makes you feel icky

300
00:12:53,459 --> 00:12:59,459
there's no way for you to say

301
00:12:55,139 --> 00:13:02,399
specifically that harmed me that is bad

302
00:12:59,459 --> 00:13:05,579
and without a right of privacy that by

303
00:13:02,399 --> 00:13:08,220
default in many circumstances we can

304
00:13:05,579 --> 00:13:10,620
expect privacy uh

305
00:13:08,220 --> 00:13:14,279
we're in a fairly weak position you go

306
00:13:10,620 --> 00:13:16,620
into court you say my some things have

307
00:13:14,279 --> 00:13:17,880
been infringed and then we have to

308
00:13:16,620 --> 00:13:19,860
scratch around and look for the

309
00:13:17,880 --> 00:13:21,240
particular law and the particular harm

310
00:13:19,860 --> 00:13:24,779
that was done

311
00:13:21,240 --> 00:13:28,079
as opposed to in many oh some rather

312
00:13:24,779 --> 00:13:31,139
other countries where we say my rights

313
00:13:28,079 --> 00:13:33,800
have been infringed you have no right to

314
00:13:31,139 --> 00:13:37,500
invade my privacy and take it away and

315
00:13:33,800 --> 00:13:40,339
that is by definition not allowable

316
00:13:37,500 --> 00:13:40,339
and so

317
00:13:40,860 --> 00:13:46,560
that is if you like the background now

318
00:13:43,980 --> 00:13:49,139
as to the implementation the law and the

319
00:13:46,560 --> 00:13:50,579
courts are really quite slow

320
00:13:49,139 --> 00:13:53,360
um and I have some sympathy with this

321
00:13:50,579 --> 00:13:55,440
I'm not sure that we want the courts and

322
00:13:53,360 --> 00:13:58,380
uh and so on

323
00:13:55,440 --> 00:14:00,660
to be reacting as the tech landscape

324
00:13:58,380 --> 00:14:01,620
changes we don't expect new laws to be

325
00:14:00,660 --> 00:14:03,240
issued

326
00:14:01,620 --> 00:14:06,000
um hot on the heels of the latest

327
00:14:03,240 --> 00:14:07,560
product from the latest Cloud company

328
00:14:06,000 --> 00:14:10,079
but really

329
00:14:07,560 --> 00:14:12,660
how can they keep up and the answer is

330
00:14:10,079 --> 00:14:13,680
as things stand in 2023 no they can't

331
00:14:12,660 --> 00:14:16,639
keep up

332
00:14:13,680 --> 00:14:20,100
legislative environment isn't working

333
00:14:16,639 --> 00:14:22,019
for the individual who has an

334
00:14:20,100 --> 00:14:23,700
expectation of their privacy

335
00:14:22,019 --> 00:14:25,139
a whole bunch of very large companies

336
00:14:23,700 --> 00:14:27,240
and some governments are invading that

337
00:14:25,139 --> 00:14:29,339
privacy or what can they do and the

338
00:14:27,240 --> 00:14:31,320
answer is if they went to court which

339
00:14:29,339 --> 00:14:33,899
very few are able to do

340
00:14:31,320 --> 00:14:35,160
whatever they went to court for is out

341
00:14:33,899 --> 00:14:38,360
of date

342
00:14:35,160 --> 00:14:42,240
before it's got to court

343
00:14:38,360 --> 00:14:44,300
the data sale industry the sale of your

344
00:14:42,240 --> 00:14:48,120
personal information and my information

345
00:14:44,300 --> 00:14:50,180
is just Galloping away and indeed it's a

346
00:14:48,120 --> 00:14:54,300
global environment here on the internet

347
00:14:50,180 --> 00:14:57,300
and my personal data from Australia or

348
00:14:54,300 --> 00:14:58,680
from wherever I'm living is broadly

349
00:14:57,300 --> 00:15:00,959
available in other countries

350
00:14:58,680 --> 00:15:02,940
particularly the United States in fact

351
00:15:00,959 --> 00:15:07,019
just last week or so you may have

352
00:15:02,940 --> 00:15:08,820
noticed there was quite a icky instance

353
00:15:07,019 --> 00:15:11,760
where

354
00:15:08,820 --> 00:15:13,740
some very zealous right-wing Catholics

355
00:15:11,760 --> 00:15:16,740
have been going around spending Millions

356
00:15:13,740 --> 00:15:19,019
buying up commercially available data

357
00:15:16,740 --> 00:15:21,300
combing through it combining the

358
00:15:19,019 --> 00:15:23,100
metadata in order to identify

359
00:15:21,300 --> 00:15:24,959
specifically

360
00:15:23,100 --> 00:15:27,540
which Catholic priests they believe

361
00:15:24,959 --> 00:15:29,699
might be gay and then going and doing

362
00:15:27,540 --> 00:15:32,579
something very Catholic about it

363
00:15:29,699 --> 00:15:34,920
and this illustrates that there is a a

364
00:15:32,579 --> 00:15:38,160
large and growing and very unpleasant

365
00:15:34,920 --> 00:15:41,820
Market in the sale of our personal data

366
00:15:38,160 --> 00:15:43,560
or perhaps metadata noting that you can

367
00:15:41,820 --> 00:15:46,100
do that in Australia

368
00:15:43,560 --> 00:15:50,160
a lot more than you might imagine

369
00:15:46,100 --> 00:15:53,459
and so evidence from court cases

370
00:15:50,160 --> 00:15:55,620
even in the regime which is

371
00:15:53,459 --> 00:15:57,380
as I hope to demonstrate The Shining

372
00:15:55,620 --> 00:16:01,920
Light On The Hill in the European Union

373
00:15:57,380 --> 00:16:04,980
is not very comforting so in 2021 there

374
00:16:01,920 --> 00:16:08,519
was a case in the um in strasbord court

375
00:16:04,980 --> 00:16:10,019
of Human Rights uh against the United

376
00:16:08,519 --> 00:16:11,899
Kingdom government

377
00:16:10,019 --> 00:16:16,320
not a European country

378
00:16:11,899 --> 00:16:17,820
anymore as you may have heard and the

379
00:16:16,320 --> 00:16:22,260
idea was

380
00:16:17,820 --> 00:16:25,079
um gchq which is the the English or

381
00:16:22,260 --> 00:16:28,199
British equivalent to Asia

382
00:16:25,079 --> 00:16:30,480
um conducts Mass surveillance activities

383
00:16:28,199 --> 00:16:32,820
that is to say it Scoops up information

384
00:16:30,480 --> 00:16:35,399
on its citizens and everybody else's

385
00:16:32,820 --> 00:16:37,259
citizens that can get it's Hands-On and

386
00:16:35,399 --> 00:16:39,420
sifts through it looking for things that

387
00:16:37,259 --> 00:16:42,000
they regard as suspicious or bad or that

388
00:16:39,420 --> 00:16:43,380
they they're just curious about

389
00:16:42,000 --> 00:16:44,880
and

390
00:16:43,380 --> 00:16:46,920
although

391
00:16:44,880 --> 00:16:50,940
the government the British government

392
00:16:46,920 --> 00:16:54,300
was told no you can't do that as broadly

393
00:16:50,940 --> 00:16:56,579
they did accept the argument but it is

394
00:16:54,300 --> 00:16:59,880
possible to limit how broadly you do

395
00:16:56,579 --> 00:17:01,560
that in other words they did not say

396
00:16:59,880 --> 00:17:04,439
there is a whole class of information

397
00:17:01,560 --> 00:17:06,720
that you just can't have access to and

398
00:17:04,439 --> 00:17:09,120
that was both a win

399
00:17:06,720 --> 00:17:10,860
for privacy advocacy in the sense that

400
00:17:09,120 --> 00:17:14,100
yes the UK government was told to back

401
00:17:10,860 --> 00:17:16,020
off in its mass surveillance and a loss

402
00:17:14,100 --> 00:17:19,079
in the sense that no the court did not

403
00:17:16,020 --> 00:17:21,720
uphold the notion that uh that

404
00:17:19,079 --> 00:17:23,880
governments are unable to constrain

405
00:17:21,720 --> 00:17:25,860
their privacy searches when they have an

406
00:17:23,880 --> 00:17:28,199
infinite data set in front of them

407
00:17:25,860 --> 00:17:31,200
because they can't that is a technical

408
00:17:28,199 --> 00:17:32,100
fact and so a lot of things to worry

409
00:17:31,200 --> 00:17:35,460
about

410
00:17:32,100 --> 00:17:36,960
calling perhaps for a different approach

411
00:17:35,460 --> 00:17:40,020
now

412
00:17:36,960 --> 00:17:42,660
um this is very um it's a most amusing

413
00:17:40,020 --> 00:17:44,880
to me map um created by someone called

414
00:17:42,660 --> 00:17:47,039
Mordor intelligence now I don't actually

415
00:17:44,880 --> 00:17:50,100
know much about mortar intelligence but

416
00:17:47,039 --> 00:17:52,260
I have in fact checked out the uh the

417
00:17:50,100 --> 00:17:53,580
these countries and the various the

418
00:17:52,260 --> 00:17:55,799
regions and the various laws that

419
00:17:53,580 --> 00:17:56,660
applies it's not too bad so this is

420
00:17:55,799 --> 00:17:59,460
about

421
00:17:56,660 --> 00:18:02,640
what is the rate of growth

422
00:17:59,460 --> 00:18:05,400
of metadata

423
00:18:02,640 --> 00:18:08,760
um industry if you like data sale uh in

424
00:18:05,400 --> 00:18:10,500
various regions and guess what uh in

425
00:18:08,760 --> 00:18:14,660
Australia and throughout Northeast Asia

426
00:18:10,500 --> 00:18:18,419
this is a high growth area now I do note

427
00:18:14,660 --> 00:18:20,580
that the Attorney General uh federal

428
00:18:18,419 --> 00:18:24,000
attorney general of Australia has

429
00:18:20,580 --> 00:18:26,720
announced that there shall be a review

430
00:18:24,000 --> 00:18:30,360
um into the uh data retention

431
00:18:26,720 --> 00:18:32,900
regulations which is welcome that is to

432
00:18:30,360 --> 00:18:35,340
say the mandatory requirement on

433
00:18:32,900 --> 00:18:37,260
Australian companies that they will keep

434
00:18:35,340 --> 00:18:40,320
our metadata

435
00:18:37,260 --> 00:18:44,460
for a period of time

436
00:18:40,320 --> 00:18:45,960
um but that is not an answer to why is

437
00:18:44,460 --> 00:18:48,539
it that Australia and many other

438
00:18:45,960 --> 00:18:53,700
countries are in a very high growth area

439
00:18:48,539 --> 00:18:57,539
for selling our private data now

440
00:18:53,700 --> 00:18:59,760
um the this is about rates of growth

441
00:18:57,539 --> 00:19:00,780
um which is why the United States for

442
00:18:59,760 --> 00:19:03,179
example

443
00:19:00,780 --> 00:19:06,179
is is not as not growing as fast as

444
00:19:03,179 --> 00:19:08,580
others it's extremely mature there still

445
00:19:06,179 --> 00:19:10,200
uh I do think that was valid I was

446
00:19:08,580 --> 00:19:12,539
interested to to see that others have

447
00:19:10,200 --> 00:19:15,120
done the work and I've checked it myself

448
00:19:12,539 --> 00:19:16,620
um yes if you're in Australia they're

449
00:19:15,120 --> 00:19:19,500
coming for us

450
00:19:16,620 --> 00:19:21,919
now this

451
00:19:19,500 --> 00:19:24,360
brings me to a very important

452
00:19:21,919 --> 00:19:26,520
fundamental if you like Epiphany for me

453
00:19:24,360 --> 00:19:30,120
in 2015

454
00:19:26,520 --> 00:19:33,600
the beginnings of the European gdpr

455
00:19:30,120 --> 00:19:34,919
um was sorting to coalesce what are we

456
00:19:33,600 --> 00:19:36,419
going to do they were saying in Europe

457
00:19:34,919 --> 00:19:39,720
and we're going to come back to this

458
00:19:36,419 --> 00:19:41,220
slide you see a couple of times I'm

459
00:19:39,720 --> 00:19:43,620
going to flick away from it because I'm

460
00:19:41,220 --> 00:19:46,860
not going to read it

461
00:19:43,620 --> 00:19:48,720
this is my personal Epiphany moment in

462
00:19:46,860 --> 00:19:51,600
developing the lumo SQL open source

463
00:19:48,720 --> 00:19:52,799
solution and and understanding what it

464
00:19:51,600 --> 00:19:56,220
might mean

465
00:19:52,799 --> 00:19:58,200
because in the beginning in the recitals

466
00:19:56,220 --> 00:19:59,460
of this document the introduction if you

467
00:19:58,200 --> 00:20:01,320
like

468
00:19:59,460 --> 00:20:04,080
um it doesn't just talk about the right

469
00:20:01,320 --> 00:20:07,440
to privacy which is there it's in the UN

470
00:20:04,080 --> 00:20:09,600
Universal Declaration of Rights uh and

471
00:20:07,440 --> 00:20:12,360
its various instruments as ratified and

472
00:20:09,600 --> 00:20:13,860
signed by Australia but not implemented

473
00:20:12,360 --> 00:20:16,260
in an Australian law

474
00:20:13,860 --> 00:20:19,260
all of these things are there

475
00:20:16,260 --> 00:20:22,440
but what was astonishing to me was that

476
00:20:19,260 --> 00:20:25,200
the human rights framework as a network

477
00:20:22,440 --> 00:20:27,780
as an interlocking collection of Rights

478
00:20:25,200 --> 00:20:29,160
is specifically referred to in the

479
00:20:27,780 --> 00:20:32,039
European General data protection

480
00:20:29,160 --> 00:20:34,980
regulation and other regulations like it

481
00:20:32,039 --> 00:20:37,080
around the world now

482
00:20:34,980 --> 00:20:38,400
um it was quite a revelation if we go

483
00:20:37,080 --> 00:20:40,500
through them

484
00:20:38,400 --> 00:20:44,880
um you skip towards the end

485
00:20:40,500 --> 00:20:46,679
this regulation is going to respect uh

486
00:20:44,880 --> 00:20:48,600
private and family life home

487
00:20:46,679 --> 00:20:51,240
Communications okay

488
00:20:48,600 --> 00:20:53,820
but freedom of thought

489
00:20:51,240 --> 00:20:55,919
and conscience and religion

490
00:20:53,820 --> 00:20:57,620
that is fundamentally connected to

491
00:20:55,919 --> 00:21:00,900
privacy

492
00:20:57,620 --> 00:21:04,260
your freedom of expression and and

493
00:21:00,900 --> 00:21:06,419
freedom to exchange information which

494
00:21:04,260 --> 00:21:09,360
may not be in any way personal

495
00:21:06,419 --> 00:21:10,700
that is a right again enshrined in the

496
00:21:09,360 --> 00:21:13,620
U.N treaties

497
00:21:10,700 --> 00:21:15,720
and founding a business

498
00:21:13,620 --> 00:21:18,900
um if something goes wrong

499
00:21:15,720 --> 00:21:20,820
the right to appeal and say no this

500
00:21:18,900 --> 00:21:23,240
isn't right to say a court or other

501
00:21:20,820 --> 00:21:25,679
thing that's called an effective remedy

502
00:21:23,240 --> 00:21:28,260
if you're accused of something a fair

503
00:21:25,679 --> 00:21:30,000
trial privacy is clearly involved in

504
00:21:28,260 --> 00:21:32,520
that as you talk to various people

505
00:21:30,000 --> 00:21:33,600
including your lawyer about what's going

506
00:21:32,520 --> 00:21:35,220
on

507
00:21:33,600 --> 00:21:36,539
um and then of course a whole host of

508
00:21:35,220 --> 00:21:39,840
issues

509
00:21:36,539 --> 00:21:43,020
um around sociological things you

510
00:21:39,840 --> 00:21:43,980
languages and religions and cultural

511
00:21:43,020 --> 00:21:46,200
beliefs

512
00:21:43,980 --> 00:21:49,620
all of these things

513
00:21:46,200 --> 00:21:52,200
are in the beginning of the gdpr as

514
00:21:49,620 --> 00:21:54,720
saying look you can't really have them

515
00:21:52,200 --> 00:21:58,559
if you don't have privacy

516
00:21:54,720 --> 00:22:02,280
and that was the aha moment for me

517
00:21:58,559 --> 00:22:03,960
because privacy rights effectively are

518
00:22:02,280 --> 00:22:07,380
human rights

519
00:22:03,960 --> 00:22:10,620
and even more so in the current age

520
00:22:07,380 --> 00:22:13,620
where if you think of for example the

521
00:22:10,620 --> 00:22:16,340
right we have in the UN Charter of

522
00:22:13,620 --> 00:22:19,440
Rights to uh to clean drinking water

523
00:22:16,340 --> 00:22:21,120
which is obviously much more important

524
00:22:19,440 --> 00:22:23,100
of much more of an issue in some

525
00:22:21,120 --> 00:22:25,980
countries than others currently

526
00:22:23,100 --> 00:22:27,240
but how do we get to that and somewhere

527
00:22:25,980 --> 00:22:29,520
along the line there will be an email

528
00:22:27,240 --> 00:22:32,880
there'll be WhatsApp there'll be maybe

529
00:22:29,520 --> 00:22:35,880
signal or other Communications related

530
00:22:32,880 --> 00:22:37,260
to that right being delivered and

531
00:22:35,880 --> 00:22:39,299
guaranteed

532
00:22:37,260 --> 00:22:41,100
and that relates to the privacy of the

533
00:22:39,299 --> 00:22:43,200
individual's concerned so

534
00:22:41,100 --> 00:22:46,440
what I have concluded and what many

535
00:22:43,200 --> 00:22:49,919
others conclude as well is that digital

536
00:22:46,440 --> 00:22:53,100
privacy is the way that all other rights

537
00:22:49,919 --> 00:22:54,000
are respected and delivered in the 21st

538
00:22:53,100 --> 00:22:57,360
century

539
00:22:54,000 --> 00:22:59,700
and that is why it matters and that is

540
00:22:57,360 --> 00:23:02,059
why the current situation really isn't

541
00:22:59,700 --> 00:23:02,059
good enough

542
00:23:02,100 --> 00:23:09,860
um the gdpr has some flaws it also has

543
00:23:06,720 --> 00:23:13,860
six or seven siblings in EU law

544
00:23:09,860 --> 00:23:17,159
that put privacy rights and Associated

545
00:23:13,860 --> 00:23:18,780
mathematics as we're going to talk about

546
00:23:17,159 --> 00:23:20,280
um at the heart of everything that

547
00:23:18,780 --> 00:23:22,860
happens online

548
00:23:20,280 --> 00:23:25,100
other countries have taken this on New

549
00:23:22,860 --> 00:23:28,679
Zealand indeed has

550
00:23:25,100 --> 00:23:31,200
a privacy rights regime which is

551
00:23:28,679 --> 00:23:32,960
compatible with the gdpr so does Japan

552
00:23:31,200 --> 00:23:36,380
so does South Korea

553
00:23:32,960 --> 00:23:40,140
Brazil and Canada

554
00:23:36,380 --> 00:23:43,380
has some degree of of

555
00:23:40,140 --> 00:23:45,840
commonality as well and we can tell that

556
00:23:43,380 --> 00:23:48,059
this is so because the European Union

557
00:23:45,840 --> 00:23:50,820
has a thing called adequacy

558
00:23:48,059 --> 00:23:52,620
which was far from perfect says we

559
00:23:50,820 --> 00:23:55,860
believe that this country and the way it

560
00:23:52,620 --> 00:23:58,559
handles personal data is roughly

561
00:23:55,860 --> 00:24:01,980
compatible with how we do it here in

562
00:23:58,559 --> 00:24:03,720
Europe so it's a bit of a gold star for

563
00:24:01,980 --> 00:24:05,700
um privacy Excellence

564
00:24:03,720 --> 00:24:08,760
um unfortunately there's some holes in

565
00:24:05,700 --> 00:24:12,000
that but we're beginning to see

566
00:24:08,760 --> 00:24:13,140
that the European approach is a race to

567
00:24:12,000 --> 00:24:15,840
the top

568
00:24:13,140 --> 00:24:17,159
um and I I feel quite strongly there's a

569
00:24:15,840 --> 00:24:19,919
distinction between what we're doing in

570
00:24:17,159 --> 00:24:22,679
Australia what we see in New Zealand

571
00:24:19,919 --> 00:24:25,200
um and uh I think

572
00:24:22,679 --> 00:24:27,120
well there's actions that need to take

573
00:24:25,200 --> 00:24:29,419
be taken and there's votes that need to

574
00:24:27,120 --> 00:24:29,419
be had

575
00:24:30,299 --> 00:24:36,900
even the current government and it's

576
00:24:33,299 --> 00:24:39,600
very different to the recent

577
00:24:36,900 --> 00:24:41,820
Government Federal Government and its

578
00:24:39,600 --> 00:24:43,919
approach but even the current federal

579
00:24:41,820 --> 00:24:45,600
government has acknowledged that there

580
00:24:43,919 --> 00:24:49,080
are all manner of things

581
00:24:45,600 --> 00:24:50,940
that aren't good enough and so this is a

582
00:24:49,080 --> 00:24:53,100
quote from the attorney general Mark Dre

583
00:24:50,940 --> 00:24:55,260
fuse about the mandatory retention

584
00:24:53,100 --> 00:24:56,820
regime

585
00:24:55,260 --> 00:24:58,559
um not being good enough

586
00:24:56,820 --> 00:25:01,679
um I would add quite a list to this

587
00:24:58,559 --> 00:25:03,539
there's been a a privacy isn't up to

588
00:25:01,679 --> 00:25:05,159
scratch report hanging around for about

589
00:25:03,539 --> 00:25:07,260
four years at the federal government

590
00:25:05,159 --> 00:25:09,900
level with a lot of recommendations

591
00:25:07,260 --> 00:25:12,240
about how to tighten things up

592
00:25:09,900 --> 00:25:15,419
um none of them address the biggest

593
00:25:12,240 --> 00:25:17,460
issue in the room of course which is

594
00:25:15,419 --> 00:25:20,580
about Australia

595
00:25:17,460 --> 00:25:22,740
believes in bulk surveillance it's in

596
00:25:20,580 --> 00:25:24,779
lockstep with the United States as the

597
00:25:22,740 --> 00:25:26,880
main partner in this in something called

598
00:25:24,779 --> 00:25:28,220
the five eyes agreement so that's

599
00:25:26,880 --> 00:25:30,600
Australia

600
00:25:28,220 --> 00:25:33,419
U.S New Zealand

601
00:25:30,600 --> 00:25:34,260
um Canada and United Kingdom

602
00:25:33,419 --> 00:25:36,299
um

603
00:25:34,260 --> 00:25:39,360
all of them Anglo countries which have

604
00:25:36,299 --> 00:25:41,520
decided that they will exert their every

605
00:25:39,360 --> 00:25:44,100
ability to Hoover up as much data as

606
00:25:41,520 --> 00:25:48,299
possible and sift through it basically

607
00:25:44,100 --> 00:25:50,820
without oversight and share the results

608
00:25:48,299 --> 00:25:53,460
um none of that is touched by what Mr

609
00:25:50,820 --> 00:25:55,380
dreyfuse is saying although I'm very

610
00:25:53,460 --> 00:25:57,919
glad he's saying that Al metadata is

611
00:25:55,380 --> 00:25:57,919
more important

612
00:25:58,080 --> 00:26:02,039
and so

613
00:26:00,299 --> 00:26:05,120
this is where we get to the pointy bit

614
00:26:02,039 --> 00:26:05,120
one moment

615
00:26:08,640 --> 00:26:16,020
um the pointy bit is what can we do and

616
00:26:11,760 --> 00:26:19,020
the we there is from uh me and my trusty

617
00:26:16,020 --> 00:26:20,700
team of Open Source developers uh me as

618
00:26:19,020 --> 00:26:24,900
an Australian and you as Australian

619
00:26:20,700 --> 00:26:27,059
citizens and everything in between

620
00:26:24,900 --> 00:26:28,919
and so

621
00:26:27,059 --> 00:26:31,020
um one of the

622
00:26:28,919 --> 00:26:33,320
very simple things is we have to think

623
00:26:31,020 --> 00:26:36,299
about our technology choices

624
00:26:33,320 --> 00:26:38,880
these are positive actions that many

625
00:26:36,299 --> 00:26:42,000
people can take in their daily lives to

626
00:26:38,880 --> 00:26:44,520
some extent it's not all gloom and doom

627
00:26:42,000 --> 00:26:46,620
and so

628
00:26:44,520 --> 00:26:48,900
um people that have a privacy geek in

629
00:26:46,620 --> 00:26:51,299
their lives will have heard

630
00:26:48,900 --> 00:26:53,100
them banging on about

631
00:26:51,299 --> 00:26:56,039
um is the source code available we make

632
00:26:53,100 --> 00:26:57,720
a purchasing decision is the source code

633
00:26:56,039 --> 00:27:00,179
available at least for the most

634
00:26:57,720 --> 00:27:03,179
important components the answer is very

635
00:27:00,179 --> 00:27:06,000
rarely a hundred percent yes because at

636
00:27:03,179 --> 00:27:08,279
some level uh devices are locked down

637
00:27:06,000 --> 00:27:10,679
there's source code relating to your

638
00:27:08,279 --> 00:27:13,799
firmware in your in your phone

639
00:27:10,679 --> 00:27:16,080
and so on it's a really good first pass

640
00:27:13,799 --> 00:27:17,760
test now at this conference I don't have

641
00:27:16,080 --> 00:27:20,159
to say too much about that

642
00:27:17,760 --> 00:27:22,860
but for example I know groups of young

643
00:27:20,159 --> 00:27:25,080
people I was delighted to discover that

644
00:27:22,860 --> 00:27:26,580
they didn't need a lecture from the

645
00:27:25,080 --> 00:27:28,140
likes of me

646
00:27:26,580 --> 00:27:30,360
um they'd just gone out and bought

647
00:27:28,140 --> 00:27:31,799
something called the free phone uh and

648
00:27:30,360 --> 00:27:35,340
there's there's four or five others

649
00:27:31,799 --> 00:27:37,320
around there which doesn't have Google

650
00:27:35,340 --> 00:27:40,260
all through it at every level it doesn't

651
00:27:37,320 --> 00:27:41,760
have closed Source applications where

652
00:27:40,260 --> 00:27:44,520
there is an obvious open source

653
00:27:41,760 --> 00:27:45,960
alternative it isn't reporting by

654
00:27:44,520 --> 00:27:48,240
default

655
00:27:45,960 --> 00:27:50,460
um your position and many other personal

656
00:27:48,240 --> 00:27:53,220
uh facts about you back to a central

657
00:27:50,460 --> 00:27:55,200
Cloud to be that Samsung's or Googles or

658
00:27:53,220 --> 00:27:58,220
whoever huawees

659
00:27:55,200 --> 00:28:01,820
um that is delightful and a really good

660
00:27:58,220 --> 00:28:04,980
example of an individual action

661
00:28:01,820 --> 00:28:06,600
uh you'll find this conference is

662
00:28:04,980 --> 00:28:08,760
absolutely full of people who will bend

663
00:28:06,600 --> 00:28:12,059
your ear about a very long list of

664
00:28:08,760 --> 00:28:14,039
options but even thinking about it is a

665
00:28:12,059 --> 00:28:16,260
good step forward

666
00:28:14,039 --> 00:28:18,179
um and there are horror stories around

667
00:28:16,260 --> 00:28:20,580
now that non-technical people are

668
00:28:18,179 --> 00:28:22,460
beginning to realize actually this is a

669
00:28:20,580 --> 00:28:24,360
serious problem

670
00:28:22,460 --> 00:28:26,580
now

671
00:28:24,360 --> 00:28:30,659
when it comes to Cloud suppliers

672
00:28:26,580 --> 00:28:33,419
and this brings up end-to-end encryption

673
00:28:30,659 --> 00:28:36,900
um particularly for example for chat

674
00:28:33,419 --> 00:28:37,919
services or video services

675
00:28:36,900 --> 00:28:40,679
um

676
00:28:37,919 --> 00:28:43,559
and the answer to that is if it isn't

677
00:28:40,679 --> 00:28:48,720
effective end-to-end encryption and by

678
00:28:43,559 --> 00:28:51,600
effective I mean if somebody hasn't

679
00:28:48,720 --> 00:28:54,480
responded to government requests to make

680
00:28:51,600 --> 00:28:57,120
that stream available to any government

681
00:28:54,480 --> 00:28:58,860
that asks

682
00:28:57,120 --> 00:29:01,500
if it has effective end-to-end

683
00:28:58,860 --> 00:29:03,419
encryption then that's what you want to

684
00:29:01,500 --> 00:29:07,020
go for and there are some tests for that

685
00:29:03,419 --> 00:29:09,179
I am not a fan of Facebook meta or uh

686
00:29:07,020 --> 00:29:11,760
WhatsApp ultimately

687
00:29:09,179 --> 00:29:13,440
but I will say this that WhatsApp does

688
00:29:11,760 --> 00:29:14,820
have end-to-end encryption now a lot of

689
00:29:13,440 --> 00:29:18,000
the metadata

690
00:29:14,820 --> 00:29:19,620
is not secure and we can tell that with

691
00:29:18,000 --> 00:29:21,659
WhatsApp because they are looking at

692
00:29:19,620 --> 00:29:24,299
introducing carefully targeted ads

693
00:29:21,659 --> 00:29:26,340
however I'm going to say something nice

694
00:29:24,299 --> 00:29:28,820
about WhatsApp they said they would

695
00:29:26,340 --> 00:29:31,919
leave the United Kingdom last week

696
00:29:28,820 --> 00:29:35,159
if the United Kingdom passes the law

697
00:29:31,919 --> 00:29:37,740
which says all end-to-end encryption

698
00:29:35,159 --> 00:29:40,440
shall be compromised with the UK

699
00:29:37,740 --> 00:29:42,480
government having a key that would

700
00:29:40,440 --> 00:29:45,179
effectively Outlaw what's happening its

701
00:29:42,480 --> 00:29:48,120
current Incarnation and they said they

702
00:29:45,179 --> 00:29:49,260
would leave the country now

703
00:29:48,120 --> 00:29:51,480
um good for them

704
00:29:49,260 --> 00:29:54,659
I would suggest maybe not using Whatsapp

705
00:29:51,480 --> 00:29:56,580
at all so signal again while not perfect

706
00:29:54,659 --> 00:30:01,080
um those who know me are aware I'm part

707
00:29:56,580 --> 00:30:03,360
of a project to uh to to implement

708
00:30:01,080 --> 00:30:05,880
um signal server

709
00:30:03,360 --> 00:30:08,520
not as part of signal.org

710
00:30:05,880 --> 00:30:11,760
but signal is the best we have today

711
00:30:08,520 --> 00:30:14,159
and signal is not only got end-to-end

712
00:30:11,760 --> 00:30:16,260
encryption but it is very careful about

713
00:30:14,159 --> 00:30:17,940
the information it leaks about who

714
00:30:16,260 --> 00:30:20,880
you're talking to and who else might be

715
00:30:17,940 --> 00:30:23,039
in a group and where are they from

716
00:30:20,880 --> 00:30:25,740
and so when it comes to Australia's data

717
00:30:23,039 --> 00:30:27,779
retention law for example

718
00:30:25,740 --> 00:30:30,419
um the most

719
00:30:27,779 --> 00:30:34,080
um that somebody like signal.org can

720
00:30:30,419 --> 00:30:37,140
supply them is an IP address

721
00:30:34,080 --> 00:30:40,380
and some metadata that that can be

722
00:30:37,140 --> 00:30:44,640
pulled out of the likes of cloudflare

723
00:30:40,380 --> 00:30:46,860
so basically signal.org is largely

724
00:30:44,640 --> 00:30:49,080
impervious

725
00:30:46,860 --> 00:30:51,419
to the Australian government's mandatory

726
00:30:49,080 --> 00:30:53,100
data retention laws that's a great

727
00:30:51,419 --> 00:30:56,460
example of something to choose and then

728
00:30:53,100 --> 00:30:57,600
finally monoculturalism

729
00:30:56,460 --> 00:31:00,419
um

730
00:30:57,600 --> 00:31:02,159
is not a social statement of something

731
00:31:00,419 --> 00:31:06,840
terribly controversial

732
00:31:02,159 --> 00:31:08,820
it's simply the fact of uh if I have 10

733
00:31:06,840 --> 00:31:11,700
000 um pieces of technology in my

734
00:31:08,820 --> 00:31:13,380
company or in my local Council and they

735
00:31:11,700 --> 00:31:14,580
all come from one supplier they all have

736
00:31:13,380 --> 00:31:17,520
related

737
00:31:14,580 --> 00:31:20,100
um source code trees then they are

738
00:31:17,520 --> 00:31:24,120
probably all vulnerable to the same

739
00:31:20,100 --> 00:31:26,220
privacy holes and that is why a lot of

740
00:31:24,120 --> 00:31:29,820
places including some enlightened local

741
00:31:26,220 --> 00:31:31,380
councils are deciding that okay they are

742
00:31:29,820 --> 00:31:33,419
going to have

743
00:31:31,380 --> 00:31:34,799
um electric electric vehicles which have

744
00:31:33,419 --> 00:31:37,500
all manner of problems with their

745
00:31:34,799 --> 00:31:40,559
software stack including privacy

746
00:31:37,500 --> 00:31:42,179
but maybe we'll get one from this Asian

747
00:31:40,559 --> 00:31:45,120
country one for the United States and

748
00:31:42,179 --> 00:31:47,460
one from Europe and mix and match our

749
00:31:45,120 --> 00:31:50,220
Fleet it's not so great for some fleet

750
00:31:47,460 --> 00:31:53,340
managers but it's not a bad protection

751
00:31:50,220 --> 00:31:55,679
against privacy and quality issues in

752
00:31:53,340 --> 00:31:58,980
the software stack and that's a very

753
00:31:55,679 --> 00:32:01,320
crude example but that level of thinking

754
00:31:58,980 --> 00:32:04,799
um is is being increasingly applied in

755
00:32:01,320 --> 00:32:08,640
larger organizations around the world

756
00:32:04,799 --> 00:32:11,159
um in my house I'm an individual and

757
00:32:08,640 --> 00:32:13,500
that level of thinking still applies

758
00:32:11,159 --> 00:32:15,860
so there are some things that I will

759
00:32:13,500 --> 00:32:19,740
give to one large name plan

760
00:32:15,860 --> 00:32:21,899
name brand cloud provider because

761
00:32:19,740 --> 00:32:24,000
I'm in the real world I have real people

762
00:32:21,899 --> 00:32:26,220
I deal with they are dealing with these

763
00:32:24,000 --> 00:32:29,100
clouds but then there are other classes

764
00:32:26,220 --> 00:32:31,380
of my personal information that

765
00:32:29,100 --> 00:32:33,000
I give to other clouds

766
00:32:31,380 --> 00:32:36,899
if I'm careful

767
00:32:33,000 --> 00:32:36,899
very careful then

768
00:32:37,020 --> 00:32:41,159
um with with the knowledge that I have

769
00:32:38,520 --> 00:32:43,980
with your research I've done I'm able to

770
00:32:41,159 --> 00:32:45,360
reduce my privacy risk overall you've

771
00:32:43,980 --> 00:32:47,880
probably heard me being very careful

772
00:32:45,360 --> 00:32:49,860
there pulling back a little it is not

773
00:32:47,880 --> 00:32:54,179
clear-cut because of course there are

774
00:32:49,860 --> 00:32:56,279
issues of combining and the large clouds

775
00:32:54,179 --> 00:32:59,460
do like to combine data and triangulate

776
00:32:56,279 --> 00:33:00,240
into us what can they produce

777
00:32:59,460 --> 00:33:03,059
um

778
00:33:00,240 --> 00:33:04,620
it's not easy but there are some actions

779
00:33:03,059 --> 00:33:06,419
we can do there are some recommendations

780
00:33:04,620 --> 00:33:08,940
we can make um

781
00:33:06,419 --> 00:33:10,440
many lists of them around

782
00:33:08,940 --> 00:33:12,240
I'm going to give a few a little later

783
00:33:10,440 --> 00:33:15,360
on

784
00:33:12,240 --> 00:33:17,179
uh oh and the most important thing which

785
00:33:15,360 --> 00:33:22,260
is actually not on this slide

786
00:33:17,179 --> 00:33:24,120
is that individuals can vote now we saw

787
00:33:22,260 --> 00:33:26,779
the last federal election

788
00:33:24,120 --> 00:33:32,220
what can happen when people get fed up

789
00:33:26,779 --> 00:33:34,380
and decide to voice an independent View

790
00:33:32,220 --> 00:33:37,260
uh and that has made a significant

791
00:33:34,380 --> 00:33:38,159
difference at at scale

792
00:33:37,260 --> 00:33:41,760
um

793
00:33:38,159 --> 00:33:44,279
similar things have happened in Chile uh

794
00:33:41,760 --> 00:33:47,220
going back a few years in Brazil

795
00:33:44,279 --> 00:33:49,860
um certainly in countries in the EU

796
00:33:47,220 --> 00:33:52,679
where individual citizens has decided

797
00:33:49,860 --> 00:33:55,380
enough is enough and they have uh

798
00:33:52,679 --> 00:33:56,700
lobbied for successfully actions at The

799
00:33:55,380 --> 00:33:59,820
Ballot Box

800
00:33:56,700 --> 00:34:03,240
relating to protecting privacy we have a

801
00:33:59,820 --> 00:34:06,840
rich series of Targets in Australia here

802
00:34:03,240 --> 00:34:10,560
um we have some great advice related to

803
00:34:06,840 --> 00:34:13,200
privacy we have this privacy review

804
00:34:10,560 --> 00:34:16,139
um we have the proposed review of

805
00:34:13,200 --> 00:34:19,260
metadata changes we have

806
00:34:16,139 --> 00:34:22,800
um some terrible pieces of legislation

807
00:34:19,260 --> 00:34:25,800
that uh that that need to be called out

808
00:34:22,800 --> 00:34:28,440
there is the 2018

809
00:34:25,800 --> 00:34:30,480
um access act

810
00:34:28,440 --> 00:34:32,520
um access and assistance Act

811
00:34:30,480 --> 00:34:34,980
which basically says the federal

812
00:34:32,520 --> 00:34:36,720
government has infinite access to

813
00:34:34,980 --> 00:34:38,820
anything happening in Australia and if

814
00:34:36,720 --> 00:34:40,139
there's a technical person involved they

815
00:34:38,820 --> 00:34:42,480
can be required to give the federal

816
00:34:40,139 --> 00:34:44,639
government a back door and they can be

817
00:34:42,480 --> 00:34:46,500
required not to talk about that

818
00:34:44,639 --> 00:34:48,359
and they can be threatened with jail if

819
00:34:46,500 --> 00:34:50,940
they don't

820
00:34:48,359 --> 00:34:52,919
um this is a maligned piece of

821
00:34:50,940 --> 00:34:55,139
legislation and the only way to deal

822
00:34:52,919 --> 00:34:56,820
with that uh is

823
00:34:55,139 --> 00:34:59,400
um in the Australian Federal Parliament

824
00:34:56,820 --> 00:35:02,220
and the only influence we have on that

825
00:34:59,400 --> 00:35:04,560
um as an individual uh is at The Ballot

826
00:35:02,220 --> 00:35:07,980
Box or through lobbying or through

827
00:35:04,560 --> 00:35:09,720
joining with others so there are things

828
00:35:07,980 --> 00:35:12,420
we can do it's not gloom and doom it's

829
00:35:09,720 --> 00:35:15,180
not the end of the world it's it's

830
00:35:12,420 --> 00:35:17,460
pretty worrying

831
00:35:15,180 --> 00:35:20,339
and of course

832
00:35:17,460 --> 00:35:23,339
one group of Open Source developers have

833
00:35:20,339 --> 00:35:26,220
decided to do something else

834
00:35:23,339 --> 00:35:29,280
we thought this is a bit rubbish what

835
00:35:26,220 --> 00:35:32,040
can we do what if we started

836
00:35:29,280 --> 00:35:34,880
from the bottom up

837
00:35:32,040 --> 00:35:38,700
is it possible that we can do something

838
00:35:34,880 --> 00:35:40,800
uh regardless of the legal regime so we

839
00:35:38,700 --> 00:35:44,099
have some some star

840
00:35:40,800 --> 00:35:47,339
um actors behind us from SSH way back

841
00:35:44,099 --> 00:35:48,660
when to Signal more modern

842
00:35:47,339 --> 00:35:51,000
um

843
00:35:48,660 --> 00:35:54,420
um with uh the there's the Guardian

844
00:35:51,000 --> 00:35:56,700
Project which is and of course tour

845
00:35:54,420 --> 00:35:59,579
wonderful pieces of Open Source that

846
00:35:56,700 --> 00:36:01,260
have decided that they can assist with

847
00:35:59,579 --> 00:36:03,180
privacy insecurity regardless of the

848
00:36:01,260 --> 00:36:06,000
legal regime great

849
00:36:03,180 --> 00:36:07,800
but for the as we've just seen for the

850
00:36:06,000 --> 00:36:09,900
individual user in practice

851
00:36:07,800 --> 00:36:11,760
non-technical person

852
00:36:09,900 --> 00:36:15,240
they're really stuck in a hard place

853
00:36:11,760 --> 00:36:17,460
today so everyone has a mobile phone and

854
00:36:15,240 --> 00:36:22,260
we've studied this quite carefully

855
00:36:17,460 --> 00:36:25,980
there is quite possibly one way in

856
00:36:22,260 --> 00:36:28,619
um it's rather ambitious but we've made

857
00:36:25,980 --> 00:36:30,720
considerable progress so every one of

858
00:36:28,619 --> 00:36:32,940
your mobile phones has a database or not

859
00:36:30,720 --> 00:36:36,359
called SQL Lite it's the world's most

860
00:36:32,940 --> 00:36:37,560
used software uh it has

861
00:36:36,359 --> 00:36:39,540
um

862
00:36:37,560 --> 00:36:42,480
um an extraordinarily good history for

863
00:36:39,540 --> 00:36:45,060
reliability I I used to think the other

864
00:36:42,480 --> 00:36:47,099
otherwise and then I realized that

865
00:36:45,060 --> 00:36:49,020
firstly I was misunderstanding and

866
00:36:47,099 --> 00:36:51,420
secondly I was misunderstanding the

867
00:36:49,020 --> 00:36:54,660
scale there is nothing else as far as I

868
00:36:51,420 --> 00:36:58,200
know uh that is non-trivial software at

869
00:36:54,660 --> 00:37:00,180
Trillium scale and there is a trillion

870
00:36:58,200 --> 00:37:02,640
scale there's if you take out your phone

871
00:37:00,180 --> 00:37:04,380
there is at least 300 databases sqlite

872
00:37:02,640 --> 00:37:06,839
databases on there if it's not streaming

873
00:37:04,380 --> 00:37:10,260
data it's probably in SQL light

874
00:37:06,839 --> 00:37:12,660
most of them as plain texts equal light

875
00:37:10,260 --> 00:37:14,339
it is possible to encrypt an entire

876
00:37:12,660 --> 00:37:15,300
sqlite database if you do the right

877
00:37:14,339 --> 00:37:18,359
Magic

878
00:37:15,300 --> 00:37:20,220
and so what if we could make a small

879
00:37:18,359 --> 00:37:22,079
change to SQL light

880
00:37:20,220 --> 00:37:23,400
uh would need to be a small change you

881
00:37:22,079 --> 00:37:24,780
don't fiddle with trillion scale

882
00:37:23,400 --> 00:37:29,220
software lately

883
00:37:24,780 --> 00:37:32,480
and what if we could in some way give

884
00:37:29,220 --> 00:37:35,099
user permissions

885
00:37:32,480 --> 00:37:36,599
enforced in SQL life and that's what

886
00:37:35,099 --> 00:37:37,500
we've been working on for the last three

887
00:37:36,599 --> 00:37:40,260
years

888
00:37:37,500 --> 00:37:44,160
and the answer is we can't

889
00:37:40,260 --> 00:37:47,040
uh and in fact we have solved the how do

890
00:37:44,160 --> 00:37:49,680
we modify sqlite without breaking sqlite

891
00:37:47,040 --> 00:37:51,960
problem we believe we have done we've

892
00:37:49,680 --> 00:37:54,720
worked very carefully with the sqlite

893
00:37:51,960 --> 00:37:57,960
community to ensure that we do we

894
00:37:54,720 --> 00:37:59,460
believe we've solved the problem of

895
00:37:57,960 --> 00:38:02,940
what

896
00:37:59,460 --> 00:38:06,900
can we give the individual user

897
00:38:02,940 --> 00:38:09,359
uh in meaningful control so

898
00:38:06,900 --> 00:38:11,940
there was unfortunately the industry

899
00:38:09,359 --> 00:38:15,780
hijacked the infamous cookie laws in the

900
00:38:11,940 --> 00:38:17,579
EU deliberately and made it so that we

901
00:38:15,780 --> 00:38:20,700
all suffer from click fatigue saying yes

902
00:38:17,579 --> 00:38:21,599
I accept cookies

903
00:38:20,700 --> 00:38:24,359
um

904
00:38:21,599 --> 00:38:26,760
how can we meaningfully give users

905
00:38:24,359 --> 00:38:28,440
control over each row of data in sqlite

906
00:38:26,760 --> 00:38:32,000
and the answer is

907
00:38:28,440 --> 00:38:32,000
with something very clever

908
00:38:32,160 --> 00:38:35,640
we use mathematics we use a form of

909
00:38:34,200 --> 00:38:37,859
encryption

910
00:38:35,640 --> 00:38:38,880
that is called attribute-based

911
00:38:37,859 --> 00:38:43,500
encryption

912
00:38:38,880 --> 00:38:45,240
uh the idea is that the you can read or

913
00:38:43,500 --> 00:38:48,720
write

914
00:38:45,240 --> 00:38:53,339
the data depending on the keys you hold

915
00:38:48,720 --> 00:38:56,160
and the user can delegate keys

916
00:38:53,339 --> 00:38:58,140
I imagine for example we think of a

917
00:38:56,160 --> 00:39:00,420
class of application on our phone

918
00:38:58,140 --> 00:39:03,300
banking apps

919
00:39:00,420 --> 00:39:05,880
what if the bank was not in charge of

920
00:39:03,300 --> 00:39:08,940
the commissions over that data if the

921
00:39:05,880 --> 00:39:11,940
user could say the banks can only read

922
00:39:08,940 --> 00:39:14,339
the data or append to it but they can't

923
00:39:11,940 --> 00:39:16,500
rewrite anything

924
00:39:14,339 --> 00:39:18,780
that is an example of what we're heading

925
00:39:16,500 --> 00:39:20,820
for so by default

926
00:39:18,780 --> 00:39:23,220
the telephone operating system that

927
00:39:20,820 --> 00:39:26,700
you're using whether it's apple or one

928
00:39:23,220 --> 00:39:28,200
of the Androids from Huawei or no matter

929
00:39:26,700 --> 00:39:28,980
who

930
00:39:28,200 --> 00:39:30,780
um

931
00:39:28,980 --> 00:39:33,720
if it's a particular class of

932
00:39:30,780 --> 00:39:35,820
application the user can select what

933
00:39:33,720 --> 00:39:38,099
that application is allowed to do and

934
00:39:35,820 --> 00:39:41,480
the permissions are in the data so

935
00:39:38,099 --> 00:39:41,480
wherever the data goes

936
00:39:42,060 --> 00:39:47,520
um is where the permissions go

937
00:39:44,220 --> 00:39:49,740
now the technical details of that are

938
00:39:47,520 --> 00:39:51,060
really quite immense

939
00:39:49,740 --> 00:39:53,880
um

940
00:39:51,060 --> 00:39:55,980
there's quite a lot to understand how

941
00:39:53,880 --> 00:39:59,960
does um attribute-based encryption work

942
00:39:55,980 --> 00:40:03,660
why have I got both a PhD and a masters

943
00:39:59,960 --> 00:40:07,079
and some very competent developers in in

944
00:40:03,660 --> 00:40:09,839
addition working on this in Rust

945
00:40:07,079 --> 00:40:12,720
and integrating that into sqlite all of

946
00:40:09,839 --> 00:40:15,900
this is really quite technical but the

947
00:40:12,720 --> 00:40:18,359
basic issue is it's possible not only to

948
00:40:15,900 --> 00:40:19,980
enforce these permissions but to roll

949
00:40:18,359 --> 00:40:23,099
them out at scale

950
00:40:19,980 --> 00:40:25,140
if we get some ducks lined up such as

951
00:40:23,099 --> 00:40:27,119
approaching the platform owners I don't

952
00:40:25,140 --> 00:40:30,180
know who we have in the audience from

953
00:40:27,119 --> 00:40:31,460
Google and Amazon today but I want to

954
00:40:30,180 --> 00:40:33,960
hear from you

955
00:40:31,460 --> 00:40:35,880
there's new namespaces there's all sorts

956
00:40:33,960 --> 00:40:37,859
of exciting reasons why you might want

957
00:40:35,880 --> 00:40:39,540
to get in making privacy enforceable

958
00:40:37,859 --> 00:40:40,740
from the user up

959
00:40:39,540 --> 00:40:43,020
now

960
00:40:40,740 --> 00:40:45,420
adoption from App developers that's a

961
00:40:43,020 --> 00:40:47,640
bit of an easier door to push because

962
00:40:45,420 --> 00:40:51,420
the current encryption options for

963
00:40:47,640 --> 00:40:54,119
sqlite aren't great and we we believe

964
00:40:51,420 --> 00:40:56,940
that we have a way to fix that we're

965
00:40:54,119 --> 00:40:57,720
very pleased with our measurements uh so

966
00:40:56,940 --> 00:41:00,500
far

967
00:40:57,720 --> 00:41:00,500
we want

968
00:41:01,020 --> 00:41:04,020
and uh

969
00:41:02,700 --> 00:41:06,480
finally

970
00:41:04,020 --> 00:41:08,579
it is ambitious to the point of

971
00:41:06,480 --> 00:41:10,859
hubristic but what if every telephone

972
00:41:08,579 --> 00:41:14,520
had this what if every line of every

973
00:41:10,859 --> 00:41:16,200
data of every sqlite database and had

974
00:41:14,520 --> 00:41:18,599
these permissions associated with it

975
00:41:16,200 --> 00:41:20,700
wherever that data went

976
00:41:18,599 --> 00:41:22,320
that would be an industry default and

977
00:41:20,700 --> 00:41:25,079
that would be privacy from the bottom up

978
00:41:22,320 --> 00:41:26,520
so that's what we're aiming for I

979
00:41:25,079 --> 00:41:30,020
understand that's the 10 minute warning

980
00:41:26,520 --> 00:41:30,020
which means we have some q and A's

981
00:41:31,560 --> 00:41:36,839
thank you Dan unfortunately that's the

982
00:41:33,839 --> 00:41:38,880
end and we've come right up to our a

983
00:41:36,839 --> 00:41:39,780
room coordinator here sorry say that

984
00:41:38,880 --> 00:41:41,820
again

985
00:41:39,780 --> 00:41:42,960
hello Amy hello

986
00:41:41,820 --> 00:41:44,400
um unfortunately that's not the 10

987
00:41:42,960 --> 00:41:48,839
minute warning we've come up right

988
00:41:44,400 --> 00:41:51,300
against our finish time at 5 25. so have

989
00:41:48,839 --> 00:41:52,859
we just now we have just sorry so sorry

990
00:41:51,300 --> 00:41:54,900
we're not able to thank you very much

991
00:41:52,859 --> 00:41:56,339
for that thank you thank you so much and

992
00:41:54,900 --> 00:41:58,260
apologies again for mangling your

993
00:41:56,339 --> 00:41:59,640
introduction thank you for picking up a

994
00:41:58,260 --> 00:42:01,640
very strange ball and running with it

995
00:41:59,640 --> 00:42:04,200
thank you so much

996
00:42:01,640 --> 00:42:05,880
and thanks to everyone else here um

997
00:42:04,200 --> 00:42:08,220
we'll see you tomorrow hopefully or at

998
00:42:05,880 --> 00:42:10,820
dinner at 6 pm thank you

999
00:42:08,220 --> 00:42:10,820
yep