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[Music]

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hello again everyone hope you had a

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lovely break

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um i know i spent my break investigating

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all sorts of new like

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open things that people are posting

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about in in the chat so i hope you had

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fun too

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um okay so next up we have irving chipto

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arsona um telling us about becoming a

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tyrant

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implementing secure boot in embeddable

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devices

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irving is an embedded systems engineer

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he enjoys conjuring complex incantations

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in an arcane language then casting it

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into a spell and inserting it into a

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piece of silicone with a magic wand

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bringing life into the previously dead

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hardware

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in short writing c programs and

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programming it with a jtag debugger

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normally an endorsed person he can

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occasionally be found chasing solar

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calories down the stewart highway in the

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australian outback

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so irving's talk is pre-recorded

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which means that irving will be in the

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chat

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during

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the talk however

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irving has asked that we saved the big

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questions for the post chat q a um so

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that they'll be in the recording um and

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are available for anyone watching the

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talk later so um irving will be in the

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chat for any clarifications or

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discussions but yet please also put any

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any

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any good questions in the questions tab

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um

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irving do you have a few words

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um

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yes um thank you for attending my first

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ever lca talk and i'd like to thank you

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people from linux research victoria that

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has

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encouraged me to submit and give me some

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feedback that's all please enjoy my talk

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hi everyone thank you for attending my

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talk about becoming a tight run

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implementing security booth in embedded

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devices

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i'm murfing and i want to talk about

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secure booth because i've seen some

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resources on how you might want how you

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could implement security on the internet

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but not much on why you might want to

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have it

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now this tool cover embedded devices not

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big servers with ufi boot

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there are some circumstances that are

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different than embedded such as you

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putting your code into the device that

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will end up in somebody else with

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physical access

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the slides for this talk is available on

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my website so if you see anything

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interesting that i will show you later

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you can just just grab the slots and

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click the urls to go through them

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now before we start there are some legal

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bits to go through so all opinions in

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this presentation are my own and not

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from my employer or any other associates

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all references are to publicly available

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information and neither i nor my

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employer takes any legal or commercial

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responsibility that might arise from

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anything in this presentation basically

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i am not a lawyer so you should consult

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with yours

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now for those who are not familiar with

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what secure boot is it's basically just

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a chain of truss mechanism where one

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something that's currently executing on

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a cpu tries to verify the integrity of

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the next thing it's supposed to execute

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before actually executing it so for

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example if you have a cpu that just

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comes out of from bring power up and

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it's actually getting its internal boot

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rom

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it will try to verify the integrity of

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say the u-boot program that

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that's it's supposed to run next before

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actually jumping into it and executing

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the u-boot binary

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this this mechanism can be done

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using either hashes like shj256 or

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public keys like rsa or ecc

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and this can provide some protection

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against tampering

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including from the physical side and not

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just from

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say the network

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now

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the factor obviously when we talk about

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anything security the first thing we'd

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ask is what's your thread model

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because

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this mechanism is basically just a tool

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and whoever controls the keys or hashes

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controls the entire process

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now

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the scenario that you often encounter is

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that someone is locking you out from

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your own hardware such as if you buy a

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laptop or a phone that has everything

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locked and you can't modify all the

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software in it

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but

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but on the other hand since it's also a

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tool it could be you that is locking

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other people out from the devices that

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you own

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and that's why the question for skill

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booth is always who should hold the keys

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because

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when

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when you don't know your adversary you

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need to figure out them first and so you

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know how to use

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this tool

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correctly and it's important to

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determine who has control and who has

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not you should not have control

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now

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security booth is mainly useful for

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preventing access or modification on the

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lower level of the bootstack

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but it's not necessarily the best tool

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against net attacks from the network

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because if you're somebody is attacking

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a system from the network by the time

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they get enough access to the timer with

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the level bits they usually gain root

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access anyway

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and everything is already open to them

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but let's start with hypothetical

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scenarios so alice computers

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makes laptops and software that runs on

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it

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and they want to control the software

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that the users can run

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so they lock their laptops with security

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so

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in this case ls computers is locking you

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out from your stuff this is again

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something that you might encounter in

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real life

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but consider a different scenario where

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pop has a steel mill that's full of

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custom control devices

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and bob does not want more malware in

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his control devices

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so

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bob being a technically savvy person

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implement secure boots to lock his

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devices inside his steel mill

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and as a result bob is now the one

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that's locking everybody else out from

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his stuff

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now let's look at the third scenario

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dave owns a hydroelectric dam similarly

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full of control devices and just like

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bob he does not want malware in his

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control devices

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but

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unlike bob dave is not tech savvy so he

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asks carol to help him either

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probably using a business contract or

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something along something else

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now carol can add secure boot into

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dave's devices and holds the key for him

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and the end result is

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carol is the one that's locking

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everybody else out of dave's stuff so

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his stuff can run properly as expected

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now you might notice that this scenario

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seems to have something in common

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which is that

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these systems needs to be trustworthy

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so

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that's why you might want to use secure

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boot to timber proof them and we talk

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when you talk about timbre proofing and

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transporting systems

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the first scenario that might come to

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your head is obviously anything that

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requires finance info things financial

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transactions such as atms where if your

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software in an atm is

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not is getting tampered they can be used

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for skimming a customer's credit card or

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worse could be subject to an attack like

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jackpotting

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where

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you they can be told to just dispense

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the contents

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now if you're an atm manufacturer the

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last thing you probably want is to see

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one of your product being dragged on

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stage by some bloke at black hat and

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being controlled remotely to dispense

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cast on its own

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and secure boot will probably help with

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this could help with this scenario

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another similar device here are the f

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terminals that you see on retail shops

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and supermarkets

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they can they can be reprogrammed to

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scheme and steal card info or worse

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you could play video games on them

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such

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and that's what that that picture is

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pointing is showing is that somebody

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managed to hack one of those systems and

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put a little racing game on them

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another

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possible machine is of course the pokeys

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or slot machines that

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probably should work as expected

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and of course your mobile phones that

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has all your personal and financial data

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and

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another different category is of course

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automotive control units and or

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industrial controls devices that

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controls heavy and powerful things cars

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cranes industrial equipment steam

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turbines

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tampering with these can actually cause

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injury death and legal liabilities in

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real life

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now you might think that if you own a

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device you should be able to modify them

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and i agree with you like if i oh if i

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buy like a little router like this and i

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want to be able to put in open wrt on

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them to make them run the way exactly

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why i want to

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but

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when it comes to this kind of heavy

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machinery

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you your tempering could actually hurt

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yourself with your modifications like

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this thing's not going to harm you the

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worst it can do is just um spew out some

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magic smoke but

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if your car if you're tampering with

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well let's let's if you're modifying

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your cars

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and then you somehow made it so the

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volume button actually

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presses the accelerator somehow then

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you're not gonna have a very pleasant

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experience when you want to

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listen to loud music on the highway

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but

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this thing this thing can get worse

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because while you can hurt yourself

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you can also be heard from somebody

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else's modifications

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like if

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imagine if you have how would you feel

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if there are several oncoming car in the

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opposite lane over over there that runs

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modified ecu code and you don't know how

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whether one of them is just going to

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start swearing left and right because

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the auto drive controls were tampered

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with

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so in this sense

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you yes i think being able to modify

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your devices is very good

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but i'm not so sure when it comes to

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opening up possibilities of injuries to

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yourself or somebody else

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00:10:49,600 --> 00:10:53,920
and then you might ask what about fixing

291
00:10:52,240 --> 00:10:57,120
bugs in those ecu's

292
00:10:53,920 --> 00:10:59,120
which is extremely it's a valid concern

293
00:10:57,120 --> 00:11:01,600
considering that there's things like

294
00:10:59,120 --> 00:11:04,240
toyota acceleration case just if you

295
00:11:01,600 --> 00:11:06,399
remember a couple years back there is a

296
00:11:04,240 --> 00:11:09,279
lawsuit that allegedly says

297
00:11:06,399 --> 00:11:12,320
that toyota engine control units could

298
00:11:09,279 --> 00:11:13,440
cause acceleration on their own

299
00:11:12,320 --> 00:11:16,160
but

300
00:11:13,440 --> 00:11:17,839
again the flip side is

301
00:11:16,160 --> 00:11:20,320
while manufacturers might have buggy

302
00:11:17,839 --> 00:11:22,720
code they still have better test setups

303
00:11:20,320 --> 00:11:24,800
than the end user for that code which

304
00:11:22,720 --> 00:11:27,680
for a vehicle might involve

305
00:11:24,800 --> 00:11:29,279
an entire engine with gas fuel and

306
00:11:27,680 --> 00:11:30,880
everything running while being

307
00:11:29,279 --> 00:11:31,600
instrumented

308
00:11:30,880 --> 00:11:33,839
so

309
00:11:31,600 --> 00:11:34,720
while you might be able to fix your own

310
00:11:33,839 --> 00:11:36,800
code

311
00:11:34,720 --> 00:11:38,240
sorry you might be able to fix the code

312
00:11:36,800 --> 00:11:40,000
in those engines

313
00:11:38,240 --> 00:11:41,519
there's no way for you to check for any

314
00:11:40,000 --> 00:11:44,240
regression

315
00:11:41,519 --> 00:11:46,560
so and i don't think even if they opened

316
00:11:44,240 --> 00:11:48,399
up all of their setting there's not very

317
00:11:46,560 --> 00:11:50,639
many people that will

318
00:11:48,399 --> 00:11:53,120
procure an engine just to test the

319
00:11:50,639 --> 00:11:57,120
validity of their modifications

320
00:11:53,120 --> 00:11:59,200
so again the same same problem where you

321
00:11:57,120 --> 00:12:00,240
i'm not so sure that

322
00:11:59,200 --> 00:12:01,040
allowing

323
00:12:00,240 --> 00:12:05,360
these

324
00:12:01,040 --> 00:12:08,000
things to be edited is a very good idea

325
00:12:05,360 --> 00:12:10,639
now at this point you might wonder hold

326
00:12:08,000 --> 00:12:12,160
on this sounds like justifications for

327
00:12:10,639 --> 00:12:14,639
vendor log in

328
00:12:12,160 --> 00:12:16,880
which certainly can be done by using the

329
00:12:14,639 --> 00:12:19,279
same timber proofing mechanism to lock

330
00:12:16,880 --> 00:12:21,360
out competitors such as generic spare

331
00:12:19,279 --> 00:12:23,040
parts third-party consumables or end

332
00:12:21,360 --> 00:12:25,920
users trying to repair the thing that

333
00:12:23,040 --> 00:12:28,880
they bought and owned themselves

334
00:12:25,920 --> 00:12:32,480
the way i think about it is this is a

335
00:12:28,880 --> 00:12:33,600
complex issue because both sides do have

336
00:12:32,480 --> 00:12:35,120
a

337
00:12:33,600 --> 00:12:36,160
reasonable

338
00:12:35,120 --> 00:12:38,240
argument

339
00:12:36,160 --> 00:12:40,720
on one side a third-party products might

340
00:12:38,240 --> 00:12:42,560
be faulty or they might not be up to

341
00:12:40,720 --> 00:12:44,000
spec or contain something dangerous as a

342
00:12:42,560 --> 00:12:45,279
result of those

343
00:12:44,000 --> 00:12:48,399
differences

344
00:12:45,279 --> 00:12:49,760
and it's actually much safer if you went

345
00:12:48,399 --> 00:12:51,760
with the first party product that has

346
00:12:49,760 --> 00:12:52,560
been tested to work well with everything

347
00:12:51,760 --> 00:12:54,000
else

348
00:12:52,560 --> 00:12:55,519
that you have

349
00:12:54,000 --> 00:12:58,000
but on the other side lack of

350
00:12:55,519 --> 00:13:00,160
competition is very bad for customers

351
00:12:58,000 --> 00:13:02,240
because once you're locked in

352
00:13:00,160 --> 00:13:04,320
in something then you're at the merchant

353
00:13:02,240 --> 00:13:06,560
whoever's locking you in

354
00:13:04,320 --> 00:13:08,959
and so the question is at what point

355
00:13:06,560 --> 00:13:11,680
does tamper proofing becomes lock-in

356
00:13:08,959 --> 00:13:14,160
i'd say i don't know

357
00:13:11,680 --> 00:13:16,240
it on one side things like safety

358
00:13:14,160 --> 00:13:18,560
critical ecu's in the car you probably

359
00:13:16,240 --> 00:13:20,720
don't want a third-party

360
00:13:18,560 --> 00:13:22,160
things for that unless you're actually

361
00:13:20,720 --> 00:13:24,240
rebuilding your engine from scratch or

362
00:13:22,160 --> 00:13:25,760
something like that but um something

363
00:13:24,240 --> 00:13:28,880
like a plastic clip like this for

364
00:13:25,760 --> 00:13:30,000
hanging your coat you probably 3d print

365
00:13:28,880 --> 00:13:30,880
it yourself

366
00:13:30,000 --> 00:13:32,399
and

367
00:13:30,880 --> 00:13:34,800
everything else in this

368
00:13:32,399 --> 00:13:38,560
in between well i guess

369
00:13:34,800 --> 00:13:41,120
the answer is as always it depends

370
00:13:38,560 --> 00:13:43,360
on the scenario

371
00:13:41,120 --> 00:13:45,839
that said while we talk about login

372
00:13:43,360 --> 00:13:48,560
another use case for secure boot is to

373
00:13:45,839 --> 00:13:50,560
help lock in secret inside the device

374
00:13:48,560 --> 00:13:53,360
and help protecting them

375
00:13:50,560 --> 00:13:56,079
what kind of secrets well you could have

376
00:13:53,360 --> 00:13:58,160
for example user data in your phones you

377
00:13:56,079 --> 00:14:00,839
might have authentication data for f

378
00:13:58,160 --> 00:14:03,680
wash machines and setup boxes to top the

379
00:14:00,839 --> 00:14:05,839
mothership you might try to protect

380
00:14:03,680 --> 00:14:07,519
decryption keys inside the digital

381
00:14:05,839 --> 00:14:08,720
camera protectors at your local movie

382
00:14:07,519 --> 00:14:10,880
theater

383
00:14:08,720 --> 00:14:12,240
or maybe you might want to protect the

384
00:14:10,880 --> 00:14:14,320
software itself that's running inside

385
00:14:12,240 --> 00:14:16,880
your device that you've spent a lot of

386
00:14:14,320 --> 00:14:19,279
time and money on creating that secret

387
00:14:16,880 --> 00:14:22,639
sauce and you don't want any competitor

388
00:14:19,279 --> 00:14:25,279
to just jump uh stamp out mass

389
00:14:22,639 --> 00:14:27,360
clones and mass while not putting in the

390
00:14:25,279 --> 00:14:29,519
rnd effort

391
00:14:27,360 --> 00:14:31,680
and what kind of protection that

392
00:14:29,519 --> 00:14:32,800
security can provide

393
00:14:31,680 --> 00:14:34,320
mainly

394
00:14:32,800 --> 00:14:36,480
it is one of the few things that can

395
00:14:34,320 --> 00:14:38,399
help against physical attacks

396
00:14:36,480 --> 00:14:39,839
and to prevent reading out secrets from

397
00:14:38,399 --> 00:14:40,639
the hardware

398
00:14:39,839 --> 00:14:42,160
so

399
00:14:40,639 --> 00:14:45,199
for example

400
00:14:42,160 --> 00:14:47,760
if we compare with a microcontroller

401
00:14:45,199 --> 00:14:47,760
like this

402
00:14:47,839 --> 00:14:52,320
um come on focus

403
00:14:50,160 --> 00:14:56,000
so microcontrollers like this tend to

404
00:14:52,320 --> 00:14:58,240
have a readout protection by default so

405
00:14:56,000 --> 00:14:59,600
if you program the internal flash in

406
00:14:58,240 --> 00:15:01,360
this device

407
00:14:59,600 --> 00:15:02,560
and you blew off the jtag fixtures you

408
00:15:01,360 --> 00:15:04,880
can't

409
00:15:02,560 --> 00:15:06,880
then you'll find it very hard to try and

410
00:15:04,880 --> 00:15:10,839
extract the

411
00:15:06,880 --> 00:15:14,880
data from inside it on the other hand

412
00:15:10,839 --> 00:15:17,040
a embedded export like this has the cpu

413
00:15:14,880 --> 00:15:19,680
and the memory and flash one of these

414
00:15:17,040 --> 00:15:23,279
two chips

415
00:15:19,680 --> 00:15:25,519
they're separate from the cpu they are

416
00:15:23,279 --> 00:15:27,040
connected by traces on the pcb and they

417
00:15:25,519 --> 00:15:29,920
can be

418
00:15:27,040 --> 00:15:31,519
they can be sniffed

419
00:15:29,920 --> 00:15:33,279
that's it

420
00:15:31,519 --> 00:15:34,800
security's not very good for network

421
00:15:33,279 --> 00:15:36,880
attacks for the reasons i've explained

422
00:15:34,800 --> 00:15:39,120
earlier and when you're trying to defend

423
00:15:36,880 --> 00:15:41,199
against net attacks from the network

424
00:15:39,120 --> 00:15:43,680
it's basically an embedded linux device

425
00:15:41,199 --> 00:15:46,560
it's no different from your servers that

426
00:15:43,680 --> 00:15:48,560
are exposed to the internet

427
00:15:46,560 --> 00:15:51,279
now you now you wonder why would you

428
00:15:48,560 --> 00:15:53,680
need security for this because

429
00:15:51,279 --> 00:15:55,920
we have a full disencryption well

430
00:15:53,680 --> 00:15:57,440
this kind of full blob for file system

431
00:15:55,920 --> 00:15:59,440
or full list encryption is usually not

432
00:15:57,440 --> 00:16:01,759
enough for embedded devices

433
00:15:59,440 --> 00:16:03,519
because you need the secure location to

434
00:16:01,759 --> 00:16:04,639
store these decryption keys for these

435
00:16:03,519 --> 00:16:06,560
secrets

436
00:16:04,639 --> 00:16:08,639
and unlike desktop computers where you

437
00:16:06,560 --> 00:16:11,759
can have a human coming in and typing in

438
00:16:08,639 --> 00:16:13,600
the decryption password it usually you

439
00:16:11,759 --> 00:16:15,600
usually expect your device to start up

440
00:16:13,600 --> 00:16:17,600
by itself without a user entering a

441
00:16:15,600 --> 00:16:20,240
password every time

442
00:16:17,600 --> 00:16:22,079
and you also need to restrict the key

443
00:16:20,240 --> 00:16:24,560
this key access only to legitimate

444
00:16:22,079 --> 00:16:24,560
programs

445
00:16:24,720 --> 00:16:29,519
so if that sounds this problem sounds

446
00:16:26,880 --> 00:16:30,880
familiar to you you might be you might

447
00:16:29,519 --> 00:16:33,279
have heard about trusted platform

448
00:16:30,880 --> 00:16:35,199
modules or tpms

449
00:16:33,279 --> 00:16:38,800
which are basically a dedicated security

450
00:16:35,199 --> 00:16:40,320
chip that can keep a lot of secrets has

451
00:16:38,800 --> 00:16:41,440
lots of timbre protection instead of

452
00:16:40,320 --> 00:16:43,120
chips

453
00:16:41,440 --> 00:16:44,560
and you can ask it to do crypto

454
00:16:43,120 --> 00:16:45,839
operations like

455
00:16:44,560 --> 00:16:48,959
signing

456
00:16:45,839 --> 00:16:51,279
encrypting blob and so on and so forth

457
00:16:48,959 --> 00:16:52,880
they're cheap they are

458
00:16:51,279 --> 00:16:54,480
standardized so there's multiple vendors

459
00:16:52,880 --> 00:16:57,120
for them and they come with the rich

460
00:16:54,480 --> 00:16:58,800
software apis with things like open ssl

461
00:16:57,120 --> 00:17:00,720
engines and whatnot

462
00:16:58,800 --> 00:17:02,839
though that said they are secure but not

463
00:17:00,720 --> 00:17:05,760
very fast so if you're thinking

464
00:17:02,839 --> 00:17:07,600
of hooking up your ng next web server to

465
00:17:05,760 --> 00:17:10,400
this as a back-end and thinking oh i'm

466
00:17:07,600 --> 00:17:12,880
gonna my web server private keys are

467
00:17:10,400 --> 00:17:14,160
gonna be super secure well your yes it's

468
00:17:12,880 --> 00:17:16,720
gonna be secure but it's not gonna be

469
00:17:14,160 --> 00:17:17,600
very fast

470
00:17:16,720 --> 00:17:19,919
right

471
00:17:17,600 --> 00:17:21,520
if you want to use a tpm

472
00:17:19,919 --> 00:17:24,079
be aware that you should enable

473
00:17:21,520 --> 00:17:26,000
parameter encryption which will encrypt

474
00:17:24,079 --> 00:17:28,400
in communication or at least some

475
00:17:26,000 --> 00:17:31,200
communication within the cv or tpm

476
00:17:28,400 --> 00:17:33,760
otherwise you can an attacker could just

477
00:17:31,200 --> 00:17:35,760
sniff it by a logic analyzer

478
00:17:33,760 --> 00:17:38,400
and if you think attaching logic another

479
00:17:35,760 --> 00:17:41,039
seems like a lot of trouble well

480
00:17:38,400 --> 00:17:43,760
no it's not necessarily

481
00:17:41,039 --> 00:17:45,440
for example i got here a logic analyzer

482
00:17:43,760 --> 00:17:48,720
and this little

483
00:17:45,440 --> 00:17:51,120
okay come on camera focus

484
00:17:48,720 --> 00:17:52,320
logic analyzer and this little clip

485
00:17:51,120 --> 00:17:54,880
right here

486
00:17:52,320 --> 00:17:55,840
so for example if i got this random port

487
00:17:54,880 --> 00:17:57,520
there

488
00:17:55,840 --> 00:17:59,360
and you've got the

489
00:17:57,520 --> 00:18:01,360
tpm chip somewhere that's on the same

490
00:17:59,360 --> 00:18:03,440
path as that

491
00:18:01,360 --> 00:18:05,520
that chip for example you can just use

492
00:18:03,440 --> 00:18:08,320
this clip to

493
00:18:05,520 --> 00:18:09,840
clip right there and now you can sniff

494
00:18:08,320 --> 00:18:12,640
everything that goes

495
00:18:09,840 --> 00:18:12,640
throughout that chip

496
00:18:13,520 --> 00:18:18,559
there we go

497
00:18:15,360 --> 00:18:19,520
oops yeah um they're not super strong

498
00:18:18,559 --> 00:18:20,720
but

499
00:18:19,520 --> 00:18:22,720
if you just leave them on the table and

500
00:18:20,720 --> 00:18:26,160
not show them to a camera to the rest of

501
00:18:22,720 --> 00:18:26,160
the world they work perfectly well

502
00:18:26,400 --> 00:18:30,480
and also

503
00:18:28,480 --> 00:18:31,679
a tip vm needs to be initialized by

504
00:18:30,480 --> 00:18:33,679
something trustworthy they're not going

505
00:18:31,679 --> 00:18:35,280
to start by themselves and

506
00:18:33,679 --> 00:18:37,440
then start interrogating on what the

507
00:18:35,280 --> 00:18:39,360
main cpu is using uh

508
00:18:37,440 --> 00:18:41,120
executing

509
00:18:39,360 --> 00:18:42,960
so for example let's take this scenario

510
00:18:41,120 --> 00:18:45,200
we have uh that

511
00:18:42,960 --> 00:18:47,840
we have encryption with a sectional tp

512
00:18:45,200 --> 00:18:48,960
key storage and tpm or something else

513
00:18:47,840 --> 00:18:50,720
and

514
00:18:48,960 --> 00:18:51,679
there's a pro and secure but it's

515
00:18:50,720 --> 00:18:54,080
enabled

516
00:18:51,679 --> 00:18:54,840
so now we have a program right

517
00:18:54,080 --> 00:18:56,480
right

518
00:18:54,840 --> 00:18:58,799
there

519
00:18:56,480 --> 00:19:00,880
that is

520
00:18:58,799 --> 00:19:02,080
it has been verified so it's not

521
00:19:00,880 --> 00:19:04,080
tempered

522
00:19:02,080 --> 00:19:06,559
it will get the key from the key storage

523
00:19:04,080 --> 00:19:07,840
and use it to decrypt the secret and

524
00:19:06,559 --> 00:19:10,880
then it might

525
00:19:07,840 --> 00:19:12,480
read the secret and use it to do things

526
00:19:10,880 --> 00:19:14,400
and with the keyboard

527
00:19:12,480 --> 00:19:15,600
an attacker can't really tamper with

528
00:19:14,400 --> 00:19:17,760
anything here

529
00:19:15,600 --> 00:19:19,039
in this sequence and i mean

530
00:19:17,760 --> 00:19:21,039
this is all happening inside the main

531
00:19:19,039 --> 00:19:22,640
cpu

532
00:19:21,039 --> 00:19:25,200
but

533
00:19:22,640 --> 00:19:27,039
if you don't use secure boot an attacker

534
00:19:25,200 --> 00:19:29,520
could tamper with that program that's

535
00:19:27,039 --> 00:19:32,240
asking the key from the key storage

536
00:19:29,520 --> 00:19:34,320
and then he'll just decrypt the key into

537
00:19:32,240 --> 00:19:36,320
the secret and instead of using it for

538
00:19:34,320 --> 00:19:38,080
normal purposes he'll just upload it all

539
00:19:36,320 --> 00:19:39,919
to the cloud and to the rest of the

540
00:19:38,080 --> 00:19:43,760
whole world which is

541
00:19:39,919 --> 00:19:43,760
usually not what you want

542
00:19:43,919 --> 00:19:48,240
now while you've seen the advantages

543
00:19:46,960 --> 00:19:51,280
you might want to consider some

544
00:19:48,240 --> 00:19:52,400
disadvantages of secure boot as well

545
00:19:51,280 --> 00:19:54,000
first of all

546
00:19:52,400 --> 00:19:55,200
it needs a lot more development

547
00:19:54,000 --> 00:19:57,120
resources

548
00:19:55,200 --> 00:19:58,559
it need you need more engineering time

549
00:19:57,120 --> 00:20:00,960
you need multiple hardware kit because

550
00:19:58,559 --> 00:20:02,799
you might burn some of them and you

551
00:20:00,960 --> 00:20:04,720
might need to deal with nds and export

552
00:20:02,799 --> 00:20:06,799
controls all of these tech resources

553
00:20:04,720 --> 00:20:09,120
that you could put towards

554
00:20:06,799 --> 00:20:10,640
creating features or getting to market

555
00:20:09,120 --> 00:20:13,120
earlier

556
00:20:10,640 --> 00:20:15,440
you also has a rig 2 of bricking devices

557
00:20:13,120 --> 00:20:17,440
because whenever you have

558
00:20:15,440 --> 00:20:19,679
secure boot operational

559
00:20:17,440 --> 00:20:21,760
you need to tell it to make a decision

560
00:20:19,679 --> 00:20:22,799
what happens if you got verification

561
00:20:21,760 --> 00:20:25,520
failure

562
00:20:22,799 --> 00:20:26,799
should it stop working but keep all the

563
00:20:25,520 --> 00:20:29,600
secret safe

564
00:20:26,799 --> 00:20:31,919
or should it try to continue working

565
00:20:29,600 --> 00:20:33,679
maybe in a degraded state even if it's

566
00:20:31,919 --> 00:20:36,159
possibly compromised

567
00:20:33,679 --> 00:20:37,760
this is probably another thing that is

568
00:20:36,159 --> 00:20:39,760
application specific

569
00:20:37,760 --> 00:20:41,760
where if you have an airforce machine

570
00:20:39,760 --> 00:20:43,520
you probably wanted to die straight away

571
00:20:41,760 --> 00:20:44,799
taking it secret with him

572
00:20:43,520 --> 00:20:46,799
whereas

573
00:20:44,799 --> 00:20:48,720
something that controls some machinery

574
00:20:46,799 --> 00:20:51,679
you probably want to get into some sort

575
00:20:48,720 --> 00:20:51,679
of safe mode

576
00:20:52,080 --> 00:20:56,799
of some sort

577
00:20:54,400 --> 00:20:59,200
another problem is that it makes it hard

578
00:20:56,799 --> 00:21:02,080
to use gpl v3 software because one of

579
00:20:59,200 --> 00:21:03,360
the requirements is that the end user as

580
00:21:02,080 --> 00:21:06,080
in the

581
00:21:03,360 --> 00:21:08,960
user that actually is in possession of

582
00:21:06,080 --> 00:21:12,000
that device must be able to modify the

583
00:21:08,960 --> 00:21:14,960
gplv code in the in the device not every

584
00:21:12,000 --> 00:21:16,559
code in reverse just the gpl v3 ones

585
00:21:14,960 --> 00:21:19,120
but even then it seems completely

586
00:21:16,559 --> 00:21:21,840
contradictory to security because

587
00:21:19,120 --> 00:21:23,440
you the idea is you want to lock

588
00:21:21,840 --> 00:21:25,280
everything

589
00:21:23,440 --> 00:21:26,640
prevent this kind of modification rather

590
00:21:25,280 --> 00:21:29,840
in the first place

591
00:21:26,640 --> 00:21:32,080
this does makes it harder but it's not

592
00:21:29,840 --> 00:21:33,039
make doesn't make it impossible to

593
00:21:32,080 --> 00:21:35,440
create

594
00:21:33,039 --> 00:21:38,320
products that are

595
00:21:35,440 --> 00:21:41,039
uh containing gprv3 software while still

596
00:21:38,320 --> 00:21:43,600
complying with its licenses

597
00:21:41,039 --> 00:21:45,600
now while i said it secured with is

598
00:21:43,600 --> 00:21:46,640
helpful against physical attack it's not

599
00:21:45,600 --> 00:21:48,559
foolproof

600
00:21:46,640 --> 00:21:50,640
it does absolutely nothing against logic

601
00:21:48,559 --> 00:21:52,960
analyzers like this

602
00:21:50,640 --> 00:21:55,760
you might still attack the the cpu might

603
00:21:52,960 --> 00:21:58,400
still be attacked by power analysis

604
00:21:55,760 --> 00:22:00,640
the chips in this kind of linux devices

605
00:21:58,400 --> 00:22:02,799
they might be disaltered and that might

606
00:22:00,640 --> 00:22:03,600
open new attack factors

607
00:22:02,799 --> 00:22:05,360
so

608
00:22:03,600 --> 00:22:07,120
if you really are concerned against

609
00:22:05,360 --> 00:22:08,799
physical attacks you might consider

610
00:22:07,120 --> 00:22:12,080
covering everything in

611
00:22:08,799 --> 00:22:13,760
a boxy potting compound or adding timber

612
00:22:12,080 --> 00:22:16,080
detection circuitry

613
00:22:13,760 --> 00:22:16,960
so that if the shell of the device is

614
00:22:16,080 --> 00:22:19,200
open

615
00:22:16,960 --> 00:22:20,960
you just wipe everything all the secrets

616
00:22:19,200 --> 00:22:22,320
are gone

617
00:22:20,960 --> 00:22:24,240
and lastly

618
00:22:22,320 --> 00:22:26,400
things have security bugs and they can

619
00:22:24,240 --> 00:22:28,159
be in software or in the hardware or in

620
00:22:26,400 --> 00:22:29,919
the boot roms or in the

621
00:22:28,159 --> 00:22:30,880
even in the tpm chip

622
00:22:29,919 --> 00:22:33,280
and

623
00:22:30,880 --> 00:22:35,039
these bugs can be impossible to patch

624
00:22:33,280 --> 00:22:36,640
especially if they're in hardware so you

625
00:22:35,039 --> 00:22:38,960
might have put all this effort into

626
00:22:36,640 --> 00:22:41,600
securing and locking down your device

627
00:22:38,960 --> 00:22:42,400
and then one cve later

628
00:22:41,600 --> 00:22:44,640
your

629
00:22:42,400 --> 00:22:46,480
your adversary could have

630
00:22:44,640 --> 00:22:48,880
found a way in

631
00:22:46,480 --> 00:22:50,880
now after waking the pros and cons you

632
00:22:48,880 --> 00:22:53,919
might decide that yes you would like to

633
00:22:50,880 --> 00:22:55,600
become a tyrant and to implement the qr

634
00:22:53,919 --> 00:22:56,400
boot on your devices

635
00:22:55,600 --> 00:22:58,080
well

636
00:22:56,400 --> 00:22:59,760
i have some tips for you

637
00:22:58,080 --> 00:23:01,919
first when you're looking at the

638
00:22:59,760 --> 00:23:04,320
hardware stage

639
00:23:01,919 --> 00:23:05,919
secure boot is always fender specific on

640
00:23:04,320 --> 00:23:07,120
the very first stage because the boot

641
00:23:05,919 --> 00:23:08,960
drums are all different on different

642
00:23:07,120 --> 00:23:10,960
chips so start with the fender

643
00:23:08,960 --> 00:23:13,039
instructions and

644
00:23:10,960 --> 00:23:14,720
then modify it after you've gotten

645
00:23:13,039 --> 00:23:17,120
something up and working

646
00:23:14,720 --> 00:23:19,440
i'd recommend you getting multiple

647
00:23:17,120 --> 00:23:23,679
hardware kits because you'll need to

648
00:23:19,440 --> 00:23:25,440
burn the e-fuses on at least one of them

649
00:23:23,679 --> 00:23:26,960
and you might want to test a different

650
00:23:25,440 --> 00:23:28,640
sign build so

651
00:23:26,960 --> 00:23:30,320
you might get

652
00:23:28,640 --> 00:23:32,320
two devices like this

653
00:23:30,320 --> 00:23:34,400
with one that's not modified and one

654
00:23:32,320 --> 00:23:37,360
that has the

655
00:23:34,400 --> 00:23:42,000
e-fuses burn and will verify

656
00:23:37,360 --> 00:23:44,000
code and you might want to test how the

657
00:23:42,000 --> 00:23:44,720
code behavior is different on both of

658
00:23:44,000 --> 00:23:46,720
them

659
00:23:44,720 --> 00:23:48,000
and you might also prick some of these

660
00:23:46,720 --> 00:23:51,039
devices if you're programming them in

661
00:23:48,000 --> 00:23:54,000
correctly so be prepared to lose some

662
00:23:51,039 --> 00:23:56,880
and hopefully you'd lose none

663
00:23:54,000 --> 00:24:00,240
jtag exists please remember that to make

664
00:23:56,880 --> 00:24:01,440
sure the jtag fuses are also blown off

665
00:24:00,240 --> 00:24:02,880
and

666
00:24:01,440 --> 00:24:04,880
while you're dealing with hardware you

667
00:24:02,880 --> 00:24:07,120
might also as well look at

668
00:24:04,880 --> 00:24:09,919
if there's any hardware support that

669
00:24:07,120 --> 00:24:12,159
mechanism for encrypting secrets

670
00:24:09,919 --> 00:24:13,760
soms might have these mechanisms

671
00:24:12,159 --> 00:24:16,480
otherwise you might consider adding a

672
00:24:13,760 --> 00:24:18,799
cpm into your product

673
00:24:16,480 --> 00:24:20,799
the second stage where you got start

674
00:24:18,799 --> 00:24:22,480
dealing with boot loaders on amsterdam

675
00:24:20,799 --> 00:24:25,440
this is usually you boot and you might

676
00:24:22,480 --> 00:24:29,120
involve the fa or opt which are the

677
00:24:25,440 --> 00:24:30,799
uh trustzone ultrasound stuff

678
00:24:29,120 --> 00:24:33,039
if you're using ubud i recommend using

679
00:24:30,799 --> 00:24:34,880
fit image it's very convenient because

680
00:24:33,039 --> 00:24:37,279
it verifies the kernel device three and

681
00:24:34,880 --> 00:24:39,200
in it driver fast together in one go

682
00:24:37,279 --> 00:24:41,520
and it's not

683
00:24:39,200 --> 00:24:44,000
a hardware or vendor specific so

684
00:24:41,520 --> 00:24:46,880
you can reuse the effort you you you

685
00:24:44,000 --> 00:24:48,320
have used on one hardware sorry on one

686
00:24:46,880 --> 00:24:50,080
device on another device if they're

687
00:24:48,320 --> 00:24:52,559
using different chips

688
00:24:50,080 --> 00:24:55,919
that said you might want to disable the

689
00:24:52,559 --> 00:24:57,760
environment input import and console

690
00:24:55,919 --> 00:24:59,520
because they can be used to override the

691
00:24:57,760 --> 00:25:01,760
boot scripts which

692
00:24:59,520 --> 00:25:03,679
then can be used to timer with your

693
00:25:01,760 --> 00:25:04,559
process

694
00:25:03,679 --> 00:25:06,240
now

695
00:25:04,559 --> 00:25:07,600
once you got to the initial fast and

696
00:25:06,240 --> 00:25:09,679
really fast this is where you start

697
00:25:07,600 --> 00:25:11,840
dealing with the encrypt dm verity or

698
00:25:09,679 --> 00:25:13,440
integrity which is for encrypting or

699
00:25:11,840 --> 00:25:15,840
verifying

700
00:25:13,440 --> 00:25:17,279
file systems well not sell file stuff

701
00:25:15,840 --> 00:25:18,640
they're blocked devices that sits under

702
00:25:17,279 --> 00:25:20,159
the file stems

703
00:25:18,640 --> 00:25:23,520
you might mix and match them depending

704
00:25:20,159 --> 00:25:24,720
on how your device memory is what memory

705
00:25:23,520 --> 00:25:27,440
kind of memory is present on your

706
00:25:24,720 --> 00:25:30,159
devices be aware that dm verity implies

707
00:25:27,440 --> 00:25:31,919
that you have a read-only partition

708
00:25:30,159 --> 00:25:33,919
and once we go through that stage once

709
00:25:31,919 --> 00:25:37,679
in it start then you're back in familiar

710
00:25:33,919 --> 00:25:38,720
territory on how to secure linux systems

711
00:25:37,679 --> 00:25:41,200
now

712
00:25:38,720 --> 00:25:42,400
when you're

713
00:25:41,200 --> 00:25:44,960
at build time

714
00:25:42,400 --> 00:25:46,640
as in the os build time there's lots of

715
00:25:44,960 --> 00:25:48,640
signing that could have been done then

716
00:25:46,640 --> 00:25:51,279
and so if you're doing

717
00:25:48,640 --> 00:25:53,440
uh build time signing keep the keys

718
00:25:51,279 --> 00:25:55,520
secure on your field machines you might

719
00:25:53,440 --> 00:25:57,840
want to use separate depth separate sets

720
00:25:55,520 --> 00:26:00,080
of development and production keys to

721
00:25:57,840 --> 00:26:02,640
keep the secure boot process always on

722
00:26:00,080 --> 00:26:05,760
even on r d devices they'll get a lot

723
00:26:02,640 --> 00:26:07,840
more stress test that way

724
00:26:05,760 --> 00:26:09,279
and you

725
00:26:07,840 --> 00:26:12,000
that also means that you don't have to

726
00:26:09,279 --> 00:26:16,240
implement such a thing as disabling

727
00:26:12,000 --> 00:26:18,480
secure boot which can be

728
00:26:16,240 --> 00:26:22,080
can become a weakness

729
00:26:18,480 --> 00:26:25,679
and if your device sorry if your som has

730
00:26:22,080 --> 00:26:27,520
a real-time co-processor like a single

731
00:26:25,679 --> 00:26:29,520
cortex m4 that's used for real-time

732
00:26:27,520 --> 00:26:32,000
operations don't forget that those

733
00:26:29,520 --> 00:26:33,360
processors could also access main memory

734
00:26:32,000 --> 00:26:34,240
to some extent

735
00:26:33,360 --> 00:26:36,559
so

736
00:26:34,240 --> 00:26:38,720
if you make sure that the binaries that

737
00:26:36,559 --> 00:26:41,919
are running in this course are

738
00:26:38,720 --> 00:26:43,600
covered in your security process

739
00:26:41,919 --> 00:26:45,760
now when you're implementing your

740
00:26:43,600 --> 00:26:47,919
firmware update mechanism you really

741
00:26:45,760 --> 00:26:49,840
should use signed images to provide

742
00:26:47,919 --> 00:26:52,400
anyone inserting random code like you've

743
00:26:49,840 --> 00:26:54,480
gone through all this effort to

744
00:26:52,400 --> 00:26:56,960
secure your blue chain and surely you

745
00:26:54,480 --> 00:26:58,320
don't leave the front or wide open

746
00:26:56,960 --> 00:26:59,679
and

747
00:26:58,320 --> 00:27:01,919
while you

748
00:26:59,679 --> 00:27:04,080
well with signed side images make sure

749
00:27:01,919 --> 00:27:05,520
that the public key is secured by

750
00:27:04,080 --> 00:27:06,480
your security process so you got an

751
00:27:05,520 --> 00:27:08,080
entire

752
00:27:06,480 --> 00:27:10,960
chain of verification all the way from

753
00:27:08,080 --> 00:27:14,000
the hardware to your firmware updates

754
00:27:10,960 --> 00:27:16,720
if you encrypt those images you'd also

755
00:27:14,000 --> 00:27:19,120
need somewhere secure inside the device

756
00:27:16,720 --> 00:27:21,600
to store the keys that will be used to

757
00:27:19,120 --> 00:27:23,039
decrypt them

758
00:27:21,600 --> 00:27:25,600
when it comes to time to mass

759
00:27:23,039 --> 00:27:27,600
manufacture your device be aware that

760
00:27:25,600 --> 00:27:29,919
locking the software or some interfaces

761
00:27:27,600 --> 00:27:31,520
could limit your flexibility when it's

762
00:27:29,919 --> 00:27:33,840
design comes to designing your

763
00:27:31,520 --> 00:27:36,159
manufacturing process for example if you

764
00:27:33,840 --> 00:27:37,840
need jtag to check the test the

765
00:27:36,159 --> 00:27:40,240
connections between some chips on your

766
00:27:37,840 --> 00:27:42,880
board be aware that you need to

767
00:27:40,240 --> 00:27:45,039
test this before locking the software

768
00:27:42,880 --> 00:27:47,600
and the jtag interface because you can't

769
00:27:45,039 --> 00:27:49,360
do it otherwise and you might on the

770
00:27:47,600 --> 00:27:51,200
other hand you might find that it's

771
00:27:49,360 --> 00:27:53,200
slightly safer to

772
00:27:51,200 --> 00:27:56,640
generate private keys inside the device

773
00:27:53,200 --> 00:27:58,640
after you lock the device

774
00:27:56,640 --> 00:27:59,600
so with that in mind

775
00:27:58,640 --> 00:28:00,399
it's

776
00:27:59,600 --> 00:28:02,159
much

777
00:28:00,399 --> 00:28:04,320
i would highly recommend designing your

778
00:28:02,159 --> 00:28:06,559
mass manufacturing process early

779
00:28:04,320 --> 00:28:08,960
roughly around the time when the

780
00:28:06,559 --> 00:28:11,120
security process is also designed

781
00:28:08,960 --> 00:28:12,240
uh one thing that makes it easier is if

782
00:28:11,120 --> 00:28:13,039
you have

783
00:28:12,240 --> 00:28:14,880
a

784
00:28:13,039 --> 00:28:17,520
a trusted environment in your factory

785
00:28:14,880 --> 00:28:19,919
whether it's your trustees you got some

786
00:28:17,520 --> 00:28:22,960
trusted staff network or just a

787
00:28:19,919 --> 00:28:24,399
dedicated dedicated section because that

788
00:28:22,960 --> 00:28:26,640
reduces the number of threat factors

789
00:28:24,399 --> 00:28:30,559
that you have to deal with

790
00:28:26,640 --> 00:28:33,360
lastly if you happen to use a

791
00:28:30,559 --> 00:28:34,640
soms like this system on modules

792
00:28:33,360 --> 00:28:36,640
now you

793
00:28:34,640 --> 00:28:38,799
you might get some extra flexibility

794
00:28:36,640 --> 00:28:41,600
because this thing allows you to use a

795
00:28:38,799 --> 00:28:43,679
separate programming hardware and

796
00:28:41,600 --> 00:28:45,840
versus the real hardware so you might do

797
00:28:43,679 --> 00:28:47,840
your mass manufacturing and programming

798
00:28:45,840 --> 00:28:50,320
sorry mass programming on

799
00:28:47,840 --> 00:28:51,679
these soms in one go and then test the

800
00:28:50,320 --> 00:28:54,080
real hardware separately and then just

801
00:28:51,679 --> 00:28:56,960
combine the two later in the late in

802
00:28:54,080 --> 00:29:00,080
in a different step

803
00:28:56,960 --> 00:29:01,440
and lastly with gplv3

804
00:29:00,080 --> 00:29:04,320
restrictions

805
00:29:01,440 --> 00:29:07,440
there's two approaches that i'm aware of

806
00:29:04,320 --> 00:29:10,080
there could be more one is to ban

807
00:29:07,440 --> 00:29:11,840
gpl v3 in your device and only use all

808
00:29:10,080 --> 00:29:13,679
tpl php2

809
00:29:11,840 --> 00:29:15,120
but of course you're missing out on the

810
00:29:13,679 --> 00:29:17,840
latest and greatest features and

811
00:29:15,120 --> 00:29:21,039
security fixes on things like bash or

812
00:29:17,840 --> 00:29:23,520
utils star gb server and

813
00:29:21,039 --> 00:29:24,559
tracing mechanisms

814
00:29:23,520 --> 00:29:27,039
you might get away with using

815
00:29:24,559 --> 00:29:28,559
alternatives with pc box or c shell or

816
00:29:27,039 --> 00:29:30,640
maybe

817
00:29:28,559 --> 00:29:31,760
just by ensuring that nothing really

818
00:29:30,640 --> 00:29:35,600
uses them

819
00:29:31,760 --> 00:29:38,080
so that they can't do much harm

820
00:29:35,600 --> 00:29:41,039
otherwise alternatively you might allow

821
00:29:38,080 --> 00:29:43,520
updating the gplv3 codes for people that

822
00:29:41,039 --> 00:29:46,240
want it so you might provide an option

823
00:29:43,520 --> 00:29:48,159
for disabling secure boot and turn the

824
00:29:46,240 --> 00:29:50,080
device into some sort of dev kit mode

825
00:29:48,159 --> 00:29:51,440
that self erases the secret keys and

826
00:29:50,080 --> 00:29:54,000
whatnot

827
00:29:51,440 --> 00:29:55,600
now if you want to dig deeper then i can

828
00:29:54,000 --> 00:29:57,600
i have a few things that i can recommend

829
00:29:55,600 --> 00:29:59,679
to you which hopefully saves you some

830
00:29:57,600 --> 00:30:01,520
digging around in google and whatnot i'm

831
00:29:59,679 --> 00:30:03,039
just gonna gloss over them quickly

832
00:30:01,520 --> 00:30:04,480
because you then you can check them out

833
00:30:03,039 --> 00:30:06,000
for yourself from

834
00:30:04,480 --> 00:30:08,240
once you've got the slides

835
00:30:06,000 --> 00:30:11,200
so if you want if you happen to do

836
00:30:08,240 --> 00:30:12,640
secure boot on nxp imx6 or 7 platform

837
00:30:11,200 --> 00:30:14,240
there's this stock that i will tightly

838
00:30:12,640 --> 00:30:15,840
recommend you to watch

839
00:30:14,240 --> 00:30:17,840
and of course the

840
00:30:15,840 --> 00:30:19,279
the official application notes are very

841
00:30:17,840 --> 00:30:21,840
useful

842
00:30:19,279 --> 00:30:24,880
uh if you're dealing with verified with

843
00:30:21,840 --> 00:30:26,880
yubit in addition to the official

844
00:30:24,880 --> 00:30:28,559
documentation in the kids repositories

845
00:30:26,880 --> 00:30:30,240
these two presentations could help you

846
00:30:28,559 --> 00:30:31,600
understand how it works and how to

847
00:30:30,240 --> 00:30:33,840
implement it

848
00:30:31,600 --> 00:30:36,240
if you're thinking of including gplv3 in

849
00:30:33,840 --> 00:30:38,960
embedded i would highly recommend this

850
00:30:36,240 --> 00:30:41,760
presentation because it covers exactly

851
00:30:38,960 --> 00:30:42,720
this topic and even covers

852
00:30:41,760 --> 00:30:45,520
some

853
00:30:42,720 --> 00:30:47,360
automotive use cases

854
00:30:45,520 --> 00:30:49,200
now if you're curious about the atm or

855
00:30:47,360 --> 00:30:52,240
fps attacks that i showed you earlier

856
00:30:49,200 --> 00:30:54,880
you can check out these videos and

857
00:30:52,240 --> 00:30:58,080
possibly even more in the black hat

858
00:30:54,880 --> 00:31:00,559
defcon conference past talks

859
00:30:58,080 --> 00:31:03,039
if you want to find out more about tpms

860
00:31:00,559 --> 00:31:04,640
there's a tpm tutorial from google

861
00:31:03,039 --> 00:31:07,120
called tpmjs

862
00:31:04,640 --> 00:31:08,640
no it's not a dpm implementation in

863
00:31:07,120 --> 00:31:10,720
javascript

864
00:31:08,640 --> 00:31:12,240
there's also a book which happens to be

865
00:31:10,720 --> 00:31:14,399
free actually

866
00:31:12,240 --> 00:31:16,799
that you can read about

867
00:31:14,399 --> 00:31:18,399
and the tpm2 software community has a

868
00:31:16,799 --> 00:31:20,799
lot of useful links

869
00:31:18,399 --> 00:31:23,120
as well

870
00:31:20,799 --> 00:31:26,480
and lastly if you want some real world

871
00:31:23,120 --> 00:31:27,360
examples of the security incidents

872
00:31:26,480 --> 00:31:29,600
you

873
00:31:27,360 --> 00:31:31,279
there's an excellent talk on from ars

874
00:31:29,600 --> 00:31:33,279
technica about

875
00:31:31,279 --> 00:31:35,600
bypassing a security security in the

876
00:31:33,279 --> 00:31:38,640
laptop that has a tpm enabled

877
00:31:35,600 --> 00:31:41,519
there's the book about stuxnet

878
00:31:38,640 --> 00:31:42,799
that is a highly recommended read and

879
00:31:41,519 --> 00:31:43,760
there's

880
00:31:42,799 --> 00:31:46,480
also

881
00:31:43,760 --> 00:31:49,279
uh the expert witness

882
00:31:46,480 --> 00:31:50,799
reports in the toyota acceleration case

883
00:31:49,279 --> 00:31:53,440
if you are

884
00:31:50,799 --> 00:31:55,120
interested in an analysis of the

885
00:31:53,440 --> 00:31:57,840
software that runs

886
00:31:55,120 --> 00:31:59,600
in this kind of industrial automotive

887
00:31:57,840 --> 00:32:01,279
environment

888
00:31:59,600 --> 00:32:03,519
and if you're interested in some

889
00:32:01,279 --> 00:32:06,399
renovated cves there is one that affects

890
00:32:03,519 --> 00:32:08,640
the boot drone in nxp imax chips there's

891
00:32:06,399 --> 00:32:11,360
another one that affects the infinion

892
00:32:08,640 --> 00:32:14,000
chips such as their tpms and security

893
00:32:11,360 --> 00:32:16,000
smart cards and there's also a software

894
00:32:14,000 --> 00:32:17,519
one that's affecting security in you

895
00:32:16,000 --> 00:32:19,840
boot

896
00:32:17,519 --> 00:32:21,760
and that is the end of the talk thank

897
00:32:19,840 --> 00:32:24,159
you very much for watching and hopefully

898
00:32:21,760 --> 00:32:25,519
i have given you enough resources so

899
00:32:24,159 --> 00:32:28,799
that you too

900
00:32:25,519 --> 00:32:30,640
could become a tyrant thank you very

901
00:32:28,799 --> 00:32:33,120
much

902
00:32:30,640 --> 00:32:36,320
irving that was beautifully put together

903
00:32:33,120 --> 00:32:37,919
um as is your laurels which you have

904
00:32:36,320 --> 00:32:39,840
earned

905
00:32:37,919 --> 00:32:43,919
thank you um

906
00:32:39,840 --> 00:32:46,240
so we have a few questions uh the top

907
00:32:43,919 --> 00:32:49,200
question at the moment is

908
00:32:46,240 --> 00:32:52,159
are there any raspberry pi class and

909
00:32:49,200 --> 00:32:54,320
price devices that support secure boot

910
00:32:52,159 --> 00:32:57,600
and tpm

911
00:32:54,320 --> 00:32:58,559
okay good question um

912
00:32:57,600 --> 00:33:00,880
you

913
00:32:58,559 --> 00:33:03,440
i'd say instead of looking at the

914
00:33:00,880 --> 00:33:05,279
devices look into the chips that are

915
00:33:03,440 --> 00:33:07,519
used in those devices the ones that i

916
00:33:05,279 --> 00:33:09,519
knew do support it and are relatively

917
00:33:07,519 --> 00:33:13,200
well documented are from the

918
00:33:09,519 --> 00:33:15,919
using nxp's imx67 or eight

919
00:33:13,200 --> 00:33:18,480
um in for tpms you can actually buy

920
00:33:15,919 --> 00:33:21,440
little tpm modules that just plugs into

921
00:33:18,480 --> 00:33:23,519
a raspberry pi i mean it's not soldered

922
00:33:21,440 --> 00:33:26,480
in but if you want to play around that

923
00:33:23,519 --> 00:33:27,679
works perfectly well

924
00:33:26,480 --> 00:33:29,840
great

925
00:33:27,679 --> 00:33:31,279
um next question

926
00:33:29,840 --> 00:33:33,200
where do you get the clips that

927
00:33:31,279 --> 00:33:34,559
intercept the chip pins for the logic

928
00:33:33,200 --> 00:33:35,760
analyzer

929
00:33:34,559 --> 00:33:38,480
oh

930
00:33:35,760 --> 00:33:41,360
that one comes from i believe uh

931
00:33:38,480 --> 00:33:43,440
element14 or you can or rs components

932
00:33:41,360 --> 00:33:46,960
dgk probably have them as well

933
00:33:43,440 --> 00:33:50,399
they're made by pomona electronics p.o

934
00:33:46,960 --> 00:33:51,760
papa oscar mike oscar

935
00:33:50,399 --> 00:33:54,159
november

936
00:33:51,760 --> 00:33:55,679
alpha pomona

937
00:33:54,159 --> 00:33:58,159
ah

938
00:33:55,679 --> 00:33:59,120
you're much better at remembering that

939
00:33:58,159 --> 00:34:03,279
um

940
00:33:59,120 --> 00:34:03,279
that alphabet quickly than i am

941
00:34:05,440 --> 00:34:10,000
um

942
00:34:07,679 --> 00:34:13,520
so the next question is can these

943
00:34:10,000 --> 00:34:15,359
techniques apply to vms

944
00:34:13,520 --> 00:34:17,679
um

945
00:34:15,359 --> 00:34:20,079
short long story short i don't know

946
00:34:17,679 --> 00:34:22,399
because i'm not an expert on vms in

947
00:34:20,079 --> 00:34:24,960
theory if you have a chain that goes

948
00:34:22,399 --> 00:34:28,320
beyond your hypervisor and it keeps

949
00:34:24,960 --> 00:34:30,320
verifying things using hashes or skis

950
00:34:28,320 --> 00:34:31,399
then it will be possible i'm not aware

951
00:34:30,320 --> 00:34:34,079
of which

952
00:34:31,399 --> 00:34:37,119
implementations exist at the moment for

953
00:34:34,079 --> 00:34:37,839
that that said um if you were thinking

954
00:34:37,119 --> 00:34:39,520
of

955
00:34:37,839 --> 00:34:41,599
if you're thinking about embedded

956
00:34:39,520 --> 00:34:42,960
contacts and thinking about putting vms

957
00:34:41,599 --> 00:34:45,359
in your embedded devices i would have

958
00:34:42,960 --> 00:34:46,800
asked why would you want to do that

959
00:34:45,359 --> 00:34:49,839
that sounds like a very interesting use

960
00:34:46,800 --> 00:34:49,839
case please share it

961
00:34:50,800 --> 00:34:55,200
for the post chat talk discussion

962
00:34:55,440 --> 00:35:00,480
post talk chat discussion

963
00:34:57,599 --> 00:35:01,520
get my words in the right order

964
00:35:00,480 --> 00:35:04,079
um

965
00:35:01,520 --> 00:35:06,079
the next question we have we have a good

966
00:35:04,079 --> 00:35:07,760
bit of time for quite a few questions so

967
00:35:06,079 --> 00:35:10,160
we're going all right

968
00:35:07,760 --> 00:35:12,560
how do we balance the need for security

969
00:35:10,160 --> 00:35:13,760
with the need for openness always the

970
00:35:12,560 --> 00:35:16,400
question

971
00:35:13,760 --> 00:35:19,119
oh it's it's always the question and i'm

972
00:35:16,400 --> 00:35:20,000
afraid my best guess is it depends

973
00:35:19,119 --> 00:35:22,640
um

974
00:35:20,000 --> 00:35:25,359
so secure put at at the end of the day

975
00:35:22,640 --> 00:35:27,359
it's basically just a tool that could

976
00:35:25,359 --> 00:35:29,200
restrict access

977
00:35:27,359 --> 00:35:31,680
and

978
00:35:29,200 --> 00:35:33,280
regarding where when and where the tool

979
00:35:31,680 --> 00:35:35,359
should be used is

980
00:35:33,280 --> 00:35:36,880
a different question on how to you you

981
00:35:35,359 --> 00:35:38,079
want to use the tool

982
00:35:36,880 --> 00:35:40,160
so i

983
00:35:38,079 --> 00:35:42,720
i i i've read that a

984
00:35:40,160 --> 00:35:45,520
separate can of worms that has existed

985
00:35:42,720 --> 00:35:47,680
all the way since what the richard

986
00:35:45,520 --> 00:35:50,880
stallman protested the use of passwords

987
00:35:47,680 --> 00:35:53,200
you see a login using passwords

988
00:35:50,880 --> 00:35:55,040
yeah i think i think that one is a

989
00:35:53,200 --> 00:35:57,119
question you have to ask every time you

990
00:35:55,040 --> 00:35:59,280
do anything one

991
00:35:57,119 --> 00:36:01,119
and if there was a nice solution we

992
00:35:59,280 --> 00:36:02,560
wouldn't still be wondering

993
00:36:01,119 --> 00:36:05,599
but it is a good question to be

994
00:36:02,560 --> 00:36:05,599
constantly asking

995
00:36:05,760 --> 00:36:11,359
okay next up

996
00:36:07,920 --> 00:36:13,359
can you summarize the issue with gpl um

997
00:36:11,359 --> 00:36:15,119
three versus gpl two in a couple of

998
00:36:13,359 --> 00:36:17,200
sentences please

999
00:36:15,119 --> 00:36:18,960
uh okay so i guess

1000
00:36:17,200 --> 00:36:22,240
for

1001
00:36:18,960 --> 00:36:25,040
gps the new thing about tpl v3 is it has

1002
00:36:22,240 --> 00:36:27,440
a clause that basically correct me if

1003
00:36:25,040 --> 00:36:29,280
i'm wrong and again i'm not your lawyer

1004
00:36:27,440 --> 00:36:31,760
it basically requires that if you give

1005
00:36:29,280 --> 00:36:34,000
somebody a device that contains code

1006
00:36:31,760 --> 00:36:34,960
that's licensed gplv3

1007
00:36:34,000 --> 00:36:37,760
the

1008
00:36:34,960 --> 00:36:42,240
person who has that device must be able

1009
00:36:37,760 --> 00:36:44,720
to replace that tpl v3 code

1010
00:36:42,240 --> 00:36:46,720
with their unmodified versions only the

1011
00:36:44,720 --> 00:36:48,480
gplv3 not necessarily the rest of the

1012
00:36:46,720 --> 00:36:49,280
device and

1013
00:36:48,480 --> 00:36:52,079
that's

1014
00:36:49,280 --> 00:36:54,960
that's why usually if you lock gpl v3

1015
00:36:52,079 --> 00:36:56,400
code using secure boot then the end user

1016
00:36:54,960 --> 00:36:57,280
can't replace it

1017
00:36:56,400 --> 00:36:59,520
uh

1018
00:36:57,280 --> 00:37:01,599
the top that i link the presentation

1019
00:36:59,520 --> 00:37:03,280
that i link just explain it in a much

1020
00:37:01,599 --> 00:37:05,359
better way than i can so i highly

1021
00:37:03,280 --> 00:37:08,400
recommend you check it out since this is

1022
00:37:05,359 --> 00:37:09,839
a there's a very very subtle nuances

1023
00:37:08,400 --> 00:37:12,800
that i didn't even realize until i

1024
00:37:09,839 --> 00:37:12,800
started reading that as well

1025
00:37:13,520 --> 00:37:19,359
what's your take on the new pluton chip

1026
00:37:15,760 --> 00:37:22,880
edition by ms for intel amd arm chip

1027
00:37:19,359 --> 00:37:26,800
cpus to do tpm within the cpu

1028
00:37:22,880 --> 00:37:28,800
so many tlas sorry about that

1029
00:37:26,800 --> 00:37:32,640
uh let's see

1030
00:37:28,800 --> 00:37:32,640
just pasting that okay so

1031
00:37:33,839 --> 00:37:37,760
intel amd

1032
00:37:35,040 --> 00:37:39,200
cpm within the cpu um

1033
00:37:37,760 --> 00:37:41,680
i think

1034
00:37:39,200 --> 00:37:44,800
from what i've read the from what little

1035
00:37:41,680 --> 00:37:49,359
i've read so far it gives the

1036
00:37:44,800 --> 00:37:51,599
ability to store secrets and it can

1037
00:37:49,359 --> 00:37:54,160
basically does the tpm stuff that's tpm

1038
00:37:51,599 --> 00:37:57,119
standard cpu that sounds like something

1039
00:37:54,160 --> 00:38:00,400
the imx chips has been able to do for a

1040
00:37:57,119 --> 00:38:02,079
long time now so it's

1041
00:38:00,400 --> 00:38:04,400
less about

1042
00:38:02,079 --> 00:38:06,720
what the chips are capable of how it

1043
00:38:04,400 --> 00:38:08,960
ends up being used

1044
00:38:06,720 --> 00:38:11,280
so it could be used for

1045
00:38:08,960 --> 00:38:12,800
good i guess it could be used for

1046
00:38:11,280 --> 00:38:15,599
not very good purposes it could be used

1047
00:38:12,800 --> 00:38:18,400
to again it could be used to lock you

1048
00:38:15,599 --> 00:38:20,160
out from the cpu that you have but

1049
00:38:18,400 --> 00:38:21,520
it could be used for you to lock

1050
00:38:20,160 --> 00:38:24,400
everybody else from the cpu that you

1051
00:38:21,520 --> 00:38:24,400
have as well i think

1052
00:38:25,920 --> 00:38:30,000
next question

1053
00:38:27,359 --> 00:38:32,000
uh with a separate tpm when you enable

1054
00:38:30,000 --> 00:38:34,640
encrypted commands between the tpm and

1055
00:38:32,000 --> 00:38:36,560
the cpu how is the logic analyzer

1056
00:38:34,640 --> 00:38:40,480
prevented from seeing the keys that

1057
00:38:36,560 --> 00:38:40,480
encrypt the rest of the communications

1058
00:38:41,040 --> 00:38:43,359
okay

1059
00:38:44,880 --> 00:38:50,560
how does so basically you're asking how

1060
00:38:47,359 --> 00:38:52,960
the parameter encryption works um i

1061
00:38:50,560 --> 00:38:55,359
i'd recommend you check the manual

1062
00:38:52,960 --> 00:38:56,880
because i wasn't the one implementing

1063
00:38:55,359 --> 00:39:00,160
that so

1064
00:38:56,880 --> 00:39:01,440
so sorry i can't give more details

1065
00:39:00,160 --> 00:39:03,680
there's always

1066
00:39:01,440 --> 00:39:05,359
reference documentation for that yeah

1067
00:39:03,680 --> 00:39:08,800
but i'm if

1068
00:39:05,359 --> 00:39:11,119
but if my best guess if you're if you're

1069
00:39:08,800 --> 00:39:14,400
willing to listen is that it's probably

1070
00:39:11,119 --> 00:39:16,240
the similar to tv hellmann exchange

1071
00:39:14,400 --> 00:39:18,480
where you can

1072
00:39:16,240 --> 00:39:20,400
generate something split them in half

1073
00:39:18,480 --> 00:39:21,920
and exchange them and then you got the

1074
00:39:20,400 --> 00:39:24,000
secret that somebody sniffing in the

1075
00:39:21,920 --> 00:39:26,800
middle won't

1076
00:39:24,000 --> 00:39:26,800
won't be able to guess

1077
00:39:27,280 --> 00:39:32,320
but that's that's a guess please check

1078
00:39:29,119 --> 00:39:34,000
what the actual thing does

1079
00:39:32,320 --> 00:39:36,800
okay

1080
00:39:34,000 --> 00:39:38,400
um the last question we've got right now

1081
00:39:36,800 --> 00:39:40,480
um although we've got time for another

1082
00:39:38,400 --> 00:39:43,200
couple if anyone wants to post one

1083
00:39:40,480 --> 00:39:47,599
before irving done answering this one

1084
00:39:43,200 --> 00:39:50,560
is does using hashes hinder updating

1085
00:39:47,599 --> 00:39:51,440
does using oh for for boot for secure

1086
00:39:50,560 --> 00:39:53,119
boot

1087
00:39:51,440 --> 00:39:54,560
yes it does so

1088
00:39:53,119 --> 00:39:56,480
that's the

1089
00:39:54,560 --> 00:40:00,000
i believe there's

1090
00:39:56,480 --> 00:40:02,240
some complication with using uh tpm pcr

1091
00:40:00,000 --> 00:40:03,920
hashes if you want to update bios or

1092
00:40:02,240 --> 00:40:07,359
something like that which i'm not an

1093
00:40:03,920 --> 00:40:09,359
expert in but yes it could uh

1094
00:40:07,359 --> 00:40:10,640
complicate updating firmware

1095
00:40:09,359 --> 00:40:12,400
that's why

1096
00:40:10,640 --> 00:40:14,319
i think using

1097
00:40:12,400 --> 00:40:17,119
public case to file that you can

1098
00:40:14,319 --> 00:40:18,640
validate them the

1099
00:40:17,119 --> 00:40:20,720
you can validate the next component

1100
00:40:18,640 --> 00:40:22,480
using hashes

1101
00:40:20,720 --> 00:40:26,240
and then you just just verify that the

1102
00:40:22,480 --> 00:40:26,240
hash matches the signatures

1103
00:40:27,200 --> 00:40:30,880
okay

1104
00:40:28,240 --> 00:40:32,319
well um that's all the questions we have

1105
00:40:30,880 --> 00:40:33,839
um so

1106
00:40:32,319 --> 00:40:35,280
thank you irving

1107
00:40:33,839 --> 00:40:37,440
for such a

1108
00:40:35,280 --> 00:40:40,160
fascinating and well put together talk

1109
00:40:37,440 --> 00:40:42,560
um you've done

1110
00:40:40,160 --> 00:40:44,400
exceedingly well for your first lca tech

1111
00:40:42,560 --> 00:40:45,680
oh wait any questions just come in hang

1112
00:40:44,400 --> 00:40:48,720
on hang on

1113
00:40:45,680 --> 00:40:51,920
uh with the increasing interest in risk

1114
00:40:48,720 --> 00:40:54,079
v cpu architecture do you think a tpm

1115
00:40:51,920 --> 00:40:56,240
module that is part of the cpu design

1116
00:40:54,079 --> 00:40:59,280
would be useful

1117
00:40:56,240 --> 00:41:01,760
uh yes because it

1118
00:40:59,280 --> 00:41:03,839
i think uh the capabilities of a tpm

1119
00:41:01,760 --> 00:41:06,480
will be very useful if it's integrated

1120
00:41:03,839 --> 00:41:09,280
inside the cpu because you just don't

1121
00:41:06,480 --> 00:41:10,800
need to worry about that sleeping

1122
00:41:09,280 --> 00:41:13,520
uh significant communication between the

1123
00:41:10,800 --> 00:41:15,359
two whether that gets used for

1124
00:41:13,520 --> 00:41:18,240
locking you out or you locking somebody

1125
00:41:15,359 --> 00:41:20,319
else out is another question

1126
00:41:18,240 --> 00:41:22,480
yes

1127
00:41:20,319 --> 00:41:23,520
that's that's how it is with most things

1128
00:41:22,480 --> 00:41:25,680
in life

1129
00:41:23,520 --> 00:41:28,800
yeah of course

1130
00:41:25,680 --> 00:41:30,560
all right okay now we will really will

1131
00:41:28,800 --> 00:41:34,319
wrap it up um

1132
00:41:30,560 --> 00:41:34,319
so yes thank you so much irving

1133
00:41:37,680 --> 00:41:43,240
thank you for everybody listening

1134
00:41:40,079 --> 00:41:43,240
see ya